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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, most workers' com-
pensation programs in the United States faced an unprece-
dented crisis. According to the messages that dominated
media, politics, and scholarship, employers' insurance pre-
miums "skyrocketed" because of increased workers' com-
pensation benefit costs.' In response, most states enacted
wide-ranging legislative reforms that substantially restricted
workers' benefits.2 This view placed the insurance companies
who financed most states' benefit systems strictly in the
background, caught between the workers' demands for ade-
quate benefits and employers' demands for affordable insur-
ance premiums.
The conventional wisdom holds that insurance costs in-
evitably reflect political choices about the amount of benefits
paid to workers. In this view, states can best control employ-
ers' insurance costs by controlling benefits. Following this
theory, the overriding focus of reform efforts was reducing
workers' "moral hazard" - more popularly described as bene-
fit fraud, waste and abuse.3 The insurance industry developed
the term moral hazard to describe the problem that people
who are protected (insured) against costs tend to take less
care to reduce those costs.4 In the dominant view, expanded
1. See, e.g., ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION:
STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT 3 (1991); Peter Kerr, A Showdown on Workers'
Compensation i  Maine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, at 36.
2. For a description and critique of the major reforms, see generally, Martha T.
McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform," 50 RUTGERS
L. REv. 657 (1998) [hereinafter Mcclusky, Illusion].
3. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Workers' Compensa-
tion: The Recent California Experience, 52 MD. L. REV. 983 (1993); Peter Kerr, Vast
Amount of Fraud Discovered in Workers' Compensation System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1991, at Al; but see McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 2, at 873-93 (criticizing this fo-
cus on worker fraud).
4. For discussions of the historical development of the term, see CAROL A.
HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE
CONTRACTS (1985); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REv.
237 (1996).
INSURER MORAL HAZARD
benefit protection for workers during the 1970s increased
costs of the system by providing incentives and opportunities
for workers to file claims for questionable injuries. Accord-
ingly, states focused on containing costs through legislation
aimed at controlling benefit fraud, restricting the types of in-
juries covered, restricting benefit amounts, and limiting
workers' ability to contest claim denials.6 As most states en-
acted these benefit reforms during the 1990s, insurance costs
generally stabilized or even decreased.
Some critics of these benefit reforms attempted to shift
the blame for high insurance costs from workers to insurance
companies by questioning whether rising insurance premi-
ums were caused by excessive insurer profits instead of (or in
addition to) excessive benefit claims." However, insurers and
scholars have countered this criticism by portraying the in-
surance industry as victims, not perpetrators, of the crisis.9
In the prevailing version of the story, states initially ad-
dressed the problem of rising insurance costs with mis-
guided attempts to control insurance rates. This story de-
scribes the problem as government moral hazard: by denying
rate increases for insurers faced with rising benefit costs,
states sought protection from the political and economic con-
sequences of expanded workers' compensation benefits. Ac-
cording to the prevailing story, this "rate suppression" forced
insurers to lose money on workers' compensation and, as a
result, to decrease their insurance supply. Threatened with
the loss of a viable insurance supply, states finally acknowl-
edged the need to reduce benefit costs to bring insurance
rates under control.
5. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 2, at 767-86 (analyzing and criticizing
this view).
6. See id. at 787-92 (describing and criticizing predominant benefit reform
trends).
7. Id. at 710.
8. See, e.g., Daniel Hays, N.Y. Governor Pushes WC Reform Proposal, 103 NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, May 24, 1999, at 1 (quoting N.Y. AFL-CIO leader's argument that poli-
ticians are wrongly blaming rate increases on injured workers instead of on insurers'
profits and control over rate regulation).
9. For some of the most prominent writers promoting this theory, both with
insurance industry funding, see PATRICIA M. DANZON & SCOTr E. HARRINGTON, RATE
REGUIATION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE: How PRICE CONTROLS INCREASE
CosTS (1998); ORIN S. KRAMER, RATE SUPPRESSION & ITS CONSEQUENCES: THE PRIVATE
PASSENGER AUTO AND WORKERS COMPENSATION EXPERIENCE (199 1).
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This article offers an alternative story of the workers'
compensation crisis and reforms by shifting the focus from
worker and regulator moral hazard to insurer moral hazard.
Contrary to the standard view, insurers are active players in
benefit systems with ample opportunities to shape, rather
than merely reflect, rising costs paid by employers (and in-
directly by workers). In particular, insurers often responded
to the benefit changes of the 1970s and early 1980s by seek-
ing cost protections that allowed them to avoid confronting
and controlling the costs of doing business in this new risk
environment. In this alternative view, rates were excessive,
not inadequate, during the period of crisis even though in-
surers sometimes lost money - because insurers inflated
costs. And the 1990s reforms reduced insurance costs not
only because of benefit cuts but also because of insurance
market reforms in some states that partly reduced these in-
surer protections and instead encouraged insurers to more
effectively control losses and expenses.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
A. Workers' Compensation: Background to the Crisis
Workers' compensation was established by state law in
the early twentieth century United States to replace state tort
law governing industrial accidents.0 In the conventional wis-
dom, workers' compensation was a compromise in which
workers gave up their right to sue in tort for workplace inju-
ries in exchange for no-fault, non-adversarial insurance cov-
erage by employers."
Virtually all states require most employers to purchase
workers' compensation insurance coverage.12  Most states
have relied primarily on private commercial insurance com-
panies to provide insurance coverage. In five states, however,
10. In addition, the federal government established several occupational accident
compensation schemes for certain categories of workers.
11. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 2, at 668-77 (analyzing and questioning
this idea of an historic bargain).
12. See Ruth Gastel, Workers' Compensation, INSURANCE INFORMATION INST. (Dec.
2000) (in practice, Texas is the only state in which coverage is optional).
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state funds are the exclusive insurance provider.'" Most
states also permit self-insurance for businesses that can sat-
isfy criteria for financial stability.14 States with private insur-
ance providers license and regulate workers' compensation
insurance carriers and provide for an insurer of last resort
(public or private) to cover those businesses unable to pur-
chase insurance in the general market.
Despite its reputation as a well-balanced bargain,'5 work-
ers and employers have continually challenged and changed
workers' compensation benefit laws. By the end of the 1960s,
decades of inflation had reduced the value of benefits below
1940 levels.1 6 Political pressure from groups concerned about
inadequate benefits led Congress to establish the National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws as part
of the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act. 7 In 1972,
this bipartisan commission issued an influential report criti-
cizing state benefits as seriously inadequate.'" The Conmis-
sion recommended that the system be federalized if states
failed to implement a list of comprehensive benefit enhance-
ments.'9 In the following decade, many states enacted legisla-
tion improving benefits and benefit access; also during this
period, administrators and judges in many states interpreted
state laws in ways that expanded workers' rights to benefits.2 0
Nonetheless, the benefit expansions fell far short, overall, of
the National Commission recommendations.2 '
This period of benefit expansion set the stage for the cost
crisis of the 1980s. Nationwide, the costs of workers' com-
13. See TERRY THOMASON, ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION: BENEFITS COSTS, AND
SAFETY UNDER ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS 304 tbl. A.8 (Upjohn Inst. 2001)
(North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming).
14. For a good background discussion of self-insurance, see John F. Burton, Jr.,
Workers' Compensation Self-Insurance, in WORKERS COMPENSATION DESK BOOK 1-39 to
1-44 (John F. Burton, Jr. & Timothy P. Schmidle eds., 1992) [hereinafter DESK BOOK].
15. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 2, at 677-78 & nn. 63-67.
16. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 19 (1972) [hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N REP.] (noting that in 1940, most states'
maximum benefits were at least two-thirds of the state's average weekly wage, but
most were below that level in 1972).
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1994).
18. NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 16, at 18.
19. Id. at 26-27.
20. See THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13, at 23.
21. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 2, at 698-99 & n. 153; National Commis-
sion Compliance, in DESK BOOK, supra note 14, at IV-1, IV-3 tbl. 2.
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pensation premiums to employers rose in the late 1970s (as a
percent of payroll), then dropped from 1980-1984, and then
rose steeply from 1985 through 1990.22 In the mid 1990s
employers' costs dropped2 3 and then did not increase for the
rest of the decade.2 4 Benefit payments to workers increased
from 1984 through about 1991, and then dropped substan-
tially as statutory benefit changes took effect in the early and
mid 1990s.25
Taken as a group nationwide, insurers lost money in
workers' compensation from 1984 to 1992.26 Beginning in
1993, insurer profits increased dramatically, reaching record
levels by the middle of the decade.2 7 During 1995, for exam-
ple, insurers' took in over $124 for every $100 of net ex-
penses;28 in comparison, insurers' worst year of losses in
1992 left them with just under $109 in net expenses for every
$100 of income.29
22. John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Benefits and Costs: Signufcant
Developments in the Early 1990s, 8 JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR,
May/June 1995, at fig. A (relying on data from the Social Security Administration).
23. John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Benefits, Costs, and Profits: An
Overview of Developments in the 1990s, 9 JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
MONITOR, NOv./DEC. 1996, at 4 tbl. 3, [hereinafter Burton, Benefits, Costs and Profits
Overview] (showing a decrease in employer expenditures in 1995 and no increase or
decrease in 1995).
24. See American Academy of Actuaries, The Workers' Compensation System: An
Analysis of Past, Present and Potential Future Crises (Spring 2000) (stating that in the
late 1990s employers enjoyed decreasing or flat prices); Gastel, supra note 12 (des-
cribing a nationwide pattern of sharply falling rates through 1999).
25. John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Benefits and Costs: Significant
Developments in the Early 1990s, in 1996 WORKERS' COMPENSATION YEAR BOOK 1-2
(John F. Burton, Jr. & Timothy P. Schmidle, eds., 1992) [hereinafter 1996 YEAR
BOOK]; Burton, Benefits, Costs and Profits Overview, supra note 23, at 3 fig. C (show-
ing a 4.8% drop in total benefits paid per 100,000 workers in 1991-92, and a 10.7%
drop in 1992-93).
26. John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Costs, 1960-1992: The Increases,
the Causes, and the Consequences, in 1994 WORKERS' COMPENSATION YEAR BOOK
(John F. Burton, Jr. & Timothy P. Schmidle, eds., 1993) [hereinafter Burton, 1994
YEAR BOOK] 1-19, tbl. A9 (A.M. Best Co. data showing overall operating ratios greater
than 100 from 1984 through 1992).
27. Burton, Benefits, Costs and Profits Overview supra note 23, at 5 fig. E, tbl. 4
(showing operating ratios of 92.4, 86.9 and 80.2 for the years 1993 through 1995
respectively).
28. Id. at 5.
29. Burton, 1994 YEAR BOOK, supra note 26, at 1-19 tbl. A9.
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B. Maine as the Crisis "Poster Child 0
In the conventional story of the workers' compensation
crisis, Maine was the leading example of the purported prob-
lem of excessive benefits and inadequate insurance rates.'
For example, in 1992 the New York Times reported on the cri-
sis with an article featuring insurers' complaints that Maine
was "the most egregious offender" violating sound principles
of benefit financing.32 The article reported that Maine's work-
ers' compensation system was about to become the first ever
to collapse because the private workers' compensation insur-
ers who provided the state's coverage were planning to with-
draw their business.3 It traced this problem to the state's re-
fusal to grant insurers' requested premium increases during
the 1980s.3 4 In particular, the article reported that regulators
refused to grant any rate increases from 1981 to 1987. and
even mandated an 8 percent rate reduction in 1985."
The article further reported that, during the 1980s, in-
surers responded to this rate squeeze by dropping most em-
ployers from regular "voluntary market" coverage, instead
relegating them to what was known as the "residual market"
insurance pool.3 6 The "voluntary market" consists of policies
in which employers purchase (state-mandated) policies in the
competitive market through voluntary contracts with insur-
ers.3 7 The "residual" or "assigned risk" market, in contrast, is
the insurance source states set up to cover employers unable
to find an insurer to "voluntarily" sell them a policy.3" Like
most states, Maine required private insurers participating in
the state's market to operate this pool for employers unable
to obtain mandatory workers' compensation insurance else-
30. See Brian K. Atchinson, Maine Defends Plan To Save Workers' Comp. Pool, 99
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July 24, 1995, at 27 (letter from Maine's Insurance Superin-
tendent noting that Maine was ridiculed as the poster child for workers' compensa-
tion reform).
31. See, e.g., DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at ix (mentioning Maine's col-
lapse in the opening sentence of the book's forward).





37. See THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13, at 322.
38. See id.
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where. All of these insurers traditionally pooled the risk that
the residual market premium and other income would fail to
cover losses and expenses.
The New York Times article reported that insurers first at-
tempted to leave the state in 1987, but were enticed back by
legislation that not only cut benefits, but also allowed regula-
tors to raise rates and required employers to share half the
risk of residual market losses." However, despite rate in-
creases totalling nearly 50 percent in 1988 and 1989, insur-
ers still complained that rate increases and benefit cuts fell
short of the amount necessary to profitably underwrite most
employers.4 0 As a result, by 1992, the state's residual market
had grown to insure more than 90 percent of the state's em-
ployers.41
Even worse, the Times reported that this pool was run-
ning up a deficit estimated at $574 million.4 2 With employers
and insurers both facing steep surcharges to cover this defi-
cit, virtually all workers' compensation insurers in the state
again began regulatory procedures to relinquish their licenses
and withdraw from the state. The Times warned that work-
ers' compensation insurance costs were already unbearable
for many businesses in the state, and that, like insurers,
many employers were making plans to leave the state to avoid
the high costs of the workers' compensation system.4 3 This
report drew a picture which left benefit cuts as the only an-
swer to the state's crisis. Indeed, shortly afterward, the
Maine Legislature enacted a package of far-reaching benefit
restrictions and also deregulated insurance rates. By the late
1990s, the state's voluntary insurance market was flourish-
ing and employers' insurance costs had decreased signifi-
cantly.44





44. See MAINE DEP'T OF PROF. & FINANCIAL REGULATION, THE STATE OF COMPETITION
IN THE MAINE WORKER'S COMPENSATION MARKET (Nov. 1, 2000) (reporting that the mar-
ket remains competitive and that, prior to 2000, insurers' loss costs declined for six
consecutive years); William D. Hagar, Workers' Comp. Reforms Save Lives, Not Just
Money, 99 NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Aug. 21, 1995, at 25 (reporting that, due to reforms,
Maine's workers' compensation system "went from shambles to success"); Maine WC
Rates Heading Down, 103 NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Nov. 30, 1998, at 31.
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C. Rate Suppression Theory: Government Moral Hazard
In explaining the workers' compensation crisis nation-
wide, many workers' compensation experts paint a picture of
government moral hazard that resulted in rate suppression.
For example, in a book on the workers' compensation crisis
(published by the insurance industry), Orin Kramer and
Richard Briffault argue that state regulators in the 1980s
sought to use insurers as protection from the political and
economic costs of expanding benefits.4 5 They suggest that
states imposed rate controls on insurers as a way of avoiding
the tough choice between labor's demand for adequate bene-
fits and employers' demand for low insurance rates.4 6 They
note that, in the thirty states that authorize the National
Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) as insurers' rate
advocate, from 1985 to 1988 the regulators awarded rates
that averaged 6-15 percent below NCCI requests.4 7
Kramer and Briffault explain that regulatory attempts to
shift the price of high benefits from employers and workers to
insurers ultimately fail. "Holding rates artificially below the
levels implied by claim costs has seductive short-term appeal
but devastating long-term consequences."48 Following basic
principles of supply and demand, insurers will decrease their
supply of insurance, perhaps even leaving a state's market
completely, if the price is not adequate to make the business
profitable. Many analysts cite the growing size of residual
markets during the 1980s as evidence of rate inadequacy.4 9
In the thirty-three states with residual markets operated by
the NCCI, the residual market covered less than 10 percent of
total workers' compensation premium in 1982-84, but then
began to grow in 1985, reaching an average of 24.7 percent in
1992.0 Several states shared Maine's experience of having
the residual market grow to become the insurer for the major-
ity or even almost all of the state's employers.
45. See KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 1, at 52.
46. Id. at 52.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id. at 50-51; HARRINGTON & DANZON, supra note 9, at 15; Burton, 1994 YEAR
BOOK, supra note 26, at 1-9.
50. Burton, 1994 YEAR BOOK, supra note 26, at 1-9 fig. M.
51. In 1990, the NCCI reported Rhode Island and Louisiana as having residual
632001]
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Kramer and Briffault assume the residual market con-
sists of policies which insurers have decided cannot profitably
be insured at voluntary market rates. As a result, insur-
ance coverage in the residual market requires either higher
premiums to cover those policies or more rate suppression. If
residual market rates are insufficient to cover insurance
costs, losses typically are spread among insurers according to
their share of that state's voluntary market.5 3 But if inade-
quate residual market rates persist, resulting assessments
will further increase insurers' costs and further erode their
voluntary market earnings.5 4 If regulators do not allow insur-
ers to recoup those residual market losses from employers
through higher voluntary market rates, then insurers are
likely to further restrict their voluntary market policies (even
when the voluntary market, taken alone, contains opportuni-
ties for profitable underwriting). As residual market deficit
costs are absorbed by a smaller and smaller voluntary mar-
ket, insurers begin to withdraw from the market altogether to
avoid being left with the bulk of the residual market risk. In
a downward spiral of cost pressures, a growing residual mar-
ket with growing deficits therefore exacerbates insurance
supply problems in the "voluntary" market and threatens
complete market collapse, as happened in Maine in 1992 and
in several other states.
In the rate suppression analysis, if regulators raise vol-
untary market rates to keep insurers in the voluntary market
despite residual market losses, employers (and indirectly
their employees) in the voluntary market will in effect be
forced to subsidize higher-cost businesses in the residual
market.5 7 "Taxing" those businesses least costly to insure to
markets exceeding 50% of total premium; seven other states' residual markets ex-
ceeded 20% of the total market premium. NCCI, MANAGEMENT SUMMARY 1990: THE
WORKERS COMPENSATION REINSURANCE POOLS, at 18; see also, DANZON & HARRINGTON,
supra note 9, at 7 fig. 1-4 (showing residual market share for NCCI-managed pools in
1992).
52. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 1, at 51.
53. See THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13, at 44.
54. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 1, at 51.
55. Id.
56. See HARRINGTON & DANZON, supra note 9, at 18-19; see also infra Part III(c)(3)
(my analysis of the Maine collapse).
57. See KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 1, at 52; see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 277-89 (criticizing this theory).
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protect more costly businesses could result in fewer busi-
nesses with low losses and more businesses with high
losses.5 ' And by protecting higher-cost businesses in the re-
sidual market, those businesses would have less incentive to
engage in loss control efforts, like improved safety measures.
Or, if safer businesses leave the market to self-insure, as
many did during the 1980s, the voluntary insurance market
will be left with costlier businesses likely to cause further
problems of rate inadequacy.6 0 If, on the other hand, regula-
tors try to recognize higher costs of residual market policies
by charging higher residual market rates (as many states did
for workers' compensation during the late 1980s), then insur-
ers will be reluctant to move these purportedly costlier poli-
cies out of the residual market pool at lower voluntary market
rates.
Some analysts also suggest that rate suppression during
the 1980s drove up overall costs because inadequate rates
forced insurers to minimize loss control expenditures, includ-
ing safety promotion.6 1 Scott Harrington and Patricia Danzon
studied workers' compensation loss growth from 1984-1990
and found that losses were higher in states with indications
of what they interpreted as rate suppression (larger residual
markets and larger gaps between requested rates and ap-
proved rates).62 Another study of states that substituted
competitive pricing for rate regulation in the 1980s and early
1990s found that these deregulated states tended to have de-
creased reported injury rates compared to states with more
strictly regulated rates. However, others have found little
evidence that injury rates are related to differences in regula-
58. See HARRINGTON & DANZON, supra note 9, at 72; see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 283-87 (criticizing this theory); Kramer, supra note 9, at 80.
59. See Scott E. Harrington & Patricia M. Danzon, Rate Regulation, Safety Incen-
tives, and Loss Growth in Workers' Compensation Insurance, 73 J. Bus 569, 577
(2000).
60. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 1, at 52.
61. DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 3-32; Harrington & Danzon, supra
note 59, at 569, 570, 577.
62. See Harrington & Danzon, supra note 59, at 580-82.
63. Anthony J. Barkume & John W. Ruser, Deregulating Property-Casualty In-
surance Pricing: The Case of Workers' Compensation (unpublished paper, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, copy on file with author) (studying injury rates from 1987-1997 us-
ing Bureau of Labor Statistics data from employer reports). For a discussions of
shortcomings of the Bureau of Labor Statistics injury rate data, see MARC LINDER,
LABOR STATISTICS AND CLASS STRUGGLE 71-78 (1994).
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tory systems.64
D. Assumptions Underlying the Rate Suppression Story
The term "moral hazard" describes a simple incentive ef-
fect: protection from costs changes behavior under certain
conditions." However, the term is used to interpret those in-
centive effects negatively. The rate suppression theory relies
on two baseline assumptions to interpret the incentive effects
of regulators' controls on insurance costs as a problem of
moral hazard harmful to the public.
First, the label "moral hazard" implies a judgment that
the costs at issue should be the responsibility of the protected
party - the "insured."" In neoclassical economic terms,
"moral hazard" describes one type of "externality" - a situa-
tion where one party shifts some of the costs of its actions
onto others. Conversely, if a party gets protection from
costs that belong to others, then those costs are "internal-
ized."" The rate suppression theory assumes that the high
insurance costs from which regulators (and their employer
constituents) sought relief were the responsibility of the state
(and its employers and workers), not insurers. The standard
story of the workers' compensation crisis assumes that regu-
lators took advantage of their control over the highly uncer-
tain ratesetting process to externalize costs onto insurers-not
to internalize costs which were insurers' responsibility.
Second, and following from the first assumption, the label
"moral hazard" implies a judgment that the behavior change
resulting from cost protection is harmful, rather than helpful,
to society overall." When someone is protected from the
64. See THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13, at 264-67 (study of injury rates from
1975-1995, finding "little relationship between the statutory regulatory environment
and the frequency of lost-time injuries").
65. Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM.
U. J. GENDER, SOC. POLY & L. 115, 138 (2000) [hereinafter McClusky, Subsidized
Lives].
66. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 2, at 747 (explaining that whether one
assumes the gains or losses from risk protection are positive or negative depends on
distributive assumptions about who deserves the gains or losses).
67. Id. at 746 n. 345.
68. For an analysis and critique of the concept of "cost internalization," see id. at
724-30.
69. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives, supra note 65, at 139-40; see also Deborah A.
Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11
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costs of their actions, they will have incentives to engage in
more of those actions than they would otherwise. Whether
that behavior change is good or bad - efficient or inefficient -
depends on whether that change in costs counts as cost-
internalizing or cost-externalizing. By neoclassical economic
definition, cost-internalizing provides incentives for maximiz-
ing aggregate welfare. It means that a person's self-interested
cost-benefit calculations reflect the public interest because
the person takes into account (internalizes) the aggregate so-
cial costs in her decisionmaking.o Conversely, in the classic
economic analysis, cost-externalizing creates incentives that
decrease aggregate welfare, because a person's private cost-
benefit calculation fails to include all the relevant costs to so-
ciety.
In the rate suppression theory, the cost protection al-
lowed by regulatory constraints on insurers resulted in more
benefits for workers and more earnings for employers than
would have otherwise occurred. How do they know this is
rate suppression rather than appropriate pricing? They as-
sume this incentive effect is hamfil government interfer-
ence with the market (regulatory moral hazard) rather than
helpful government correction of the market (efficient cost-
internalization) by pointing to the decrease in insurance sup-
ply. If rate controls, and the resulting protection for workers
and employers, represented an accurate calculation of the
costs of providing insurance, then rational insurers would
have been willing to offer their underwriting services for that
price. In the standard theory, the fact that insurers withdrew
their supply and operated their business at a loss during the
1980s indicates that regulatory controls were externalizing
costs onto insurers, forcing them to subsidize workers and
employers, rather than internalizing costs.7 1
But why are insurers' demands for higher prices good
while states' demands for lower prices for benefits are bad?
(2000) (arguing that behavior changes induced by some protections from risk should
be viewed as positive "moral opportunities" instead of negative "moral hazard").
70. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance External-
ity: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 129, 161
n.138 (1990).
71. See, e.g., Burton, 1994 YEAR BOOK, supra note 26, at 1-9 (citing growing re-
sidual markets as evidence that "carriers are being forced to subsidize the workers
compensation program").
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In circular reasoning, the rate suppression story assumes
that insurers' demands represent internalized market prices
while state regulators' demands (reflecting workers' and em-
ployers' demands) represent cost-externalizing market inter-
vention. That is, the rate suppression story essentially relies
on the political and moral judgment that insurers self-
interest in higher rates reflects the public interest while
workers' and employers' interests reflect their own private
(special) interests.
E. Alternative Story: Rate Inflation from Insurer Moral Hazard
In Part III of this article, I examine the Maine example
more closely to challenge both assumptions underlying the
rate suppression theory. First, I explain arguments and evi-
dence supporting the assumption that the rate controls of the
crisis era were cost-internalizing rather than cost-
externalizing. Rather than protecting states (and their work-
ers and employers) from costs they were obligated to bear,
these rate controls can be seen as one of many (often unsuc-
cessful) attempts to counter regulatory capture by insurers
and to hold insurers to their cost-bearing obligations.
The events leading up to the crisis of the 1980s and early
1990s show a series of strategies by insurers to seek govern-
ment protection from the risks of insurance. This protection
from responsibility for cost control allowed insurers to exter-
nalize costs to employers (and workers) for many years. In-
surers' first strategy, which lasted until the crisis period, in-
volved a regulatory system designed to protect insurers from
price competition and to allow cartel control of cost informa-
tion. 7 2 This system facilitated high insurer profits - but for
decades employers' costs were kept relatively low at the ex-
pense of inadequate benefits for workers.
After political attention to workers' interests in the late
1960s and 1970s brought increased benefit levels, insurers'
political power to shift costs to employers began to erode.
Under criticism from employers and others, regulators con-
sidered lifting some of insurers' regulatory protections from
competition. Substantial opposition from insurers defeated
72. See infra notes 85-138 and accompanying text.
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this movement for deregulation in most states in the early
1980s, however.
Next, employers and labor groups mobilized to change
the regulatory process that insurers established and de-
fended. As insurance costs continued to rise, pressure from
these groups encouraged regulators to revise the largely self-
regulated ratesetting process to facilitate greater public par-
ticipation and to require more objective evidence of insurance
costs. Using the model of public utility regulation, regulators
in many states tried to increase scrutiny of rate filings to pre-
vent insurers from taking advantage of their protection from
competition and their control over cost data to externalize
costs onto workers and employers.7 4 However, these new
standards for ratesetting sparked resistance from insurers
and resulted in disputes between regulators and insurers
over requested rate increases.
As insurers began to lose primary control over the regula-
tory system, they adopted a second set of strategies for seek-
ing protection from risk instead of increasing their attention
to cost control. Without the security of virtually automatic
cost increases (or meager benefits), individual insurers moved
many of their policyholders into "residual market" pools that
shifted much of the risk of high losses to other insurers (and
sometimes to employers and taxpayers) but which offered op-
portunities for high, short-term profits.
In conjunction with this strategy, insurers mobilized em-
ployers and others to blame workers for the continuing high
costs and growing residual markets. In this alternative story,
benefit-cutting reforms of the early 1990s are a further in-
stance of insurer moral hazard rather than the cost-
internalizing answer to a crisis sparked by regulatory and
worker moral hazard. Faced with increased demands from
regulators and employers to provide more cost-effective in-
surance, the private insurance industry aggressively lobbied
state politicians for benefit cuts that would help shift respon-
sibility for reducing system costs from insurers (and employ-
73. See tnfra notes 112-18 and accompany text.
74. See infra notes 150-51 and accompany text.
75. See infra notes 140-63 and accompany text.
76. See infra notes 186-207 and accompany text.
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ers) to workers.7 Insurers devoted substantial resources to
publicity campaigns blaming worker moral hazard for high
benefit costs, sometimes using misleading or groundless sta-
tistics inflating the evidence of worker fraud.7 8 The NCCI de-
nied reports of substantial opportunities for insurers and
employers to reduce costs through improved safety promo-
tion; instead, the NCCI argued that "raising rates and crack-
ing down on fraud are much more important" than injury
prevention in alleviating the cost crisis.79 By blaming worker
and regulator moral hazard for falling profits and declining
market share, insurers could once again avoid scrutiny of
their own cost-inflating practices by their customers, the me-
dia and politicians. With the protection of restricted benefits,
insurers could enjoy substantial profits throughout the
1990s. 0
My alternative account of the crisis also challenges the
second assumption underlying the rate suppression story of
regulator and worker moral hazard. In this alternative pic-
ture, the long-term behavior changes caused by the rate caps
were beneficial rather than harmful to the public in general.
First, insurers' failure to supply insurance at the price regu-
lators demanded was in part a sign of insurers' inefficiency -
their failure to reduce costs effectively - rather than a sign
that regulators acted inefficiently by avoiding the costs of the
system. After all, in a market economy, declining sales and
profits may indicate that a business is not competitive rather
77. See, e.g., STEVEN D. MILuKAN & COLETTE A. LEMKE, 1993 ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE
REVIEW, WORKERS COMPENSATION LEGISLATION 1, 3 (1994) (describing insurance in-
dustry group's "proactive" legislative reform action plan); NCCI Task Force Adds Four
States to Cost Containment 'Action' List, 2 WORKERS' COMP. REP. (BNA), June 10, 1991
(reporting on insurance industry organization's coordinated efforts to target 12 states
for benefit reform).
78. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 2, at 873-88 (criticizing reform argu-
ments and legislation focusing on claimant fraud); LABOR RESEARCH Ass'N, WORKERS'
COMPENSATION FRAUD: THE REAL STORY (June 1998), available at <http://
www.laborresearch.org/ind-temps/work-comp-fraud-rpt.html> (last visited June 3,
2001) (summarizing critiques of insurers' exaggerated reports of claimant fraud); Ted
Rohrlich & Evelyn Larrubia, Anti-Fraud Drive Proves Costly for Employees Benefits,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, at Al (investigating California's anti-fraud campaign as
part of "a national trend to shift workers' comp costs from employers and insurers to
workers").
79. Michael Schachner, Seeking an End to the Work Comp Crisis, Bus. INS., Jan.
4, 1993, at 11 (reporting comments of William Hager, NCCI president and CEO at an
insurance industry conference).
80. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 2, at 708-10.
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than that buyers are too demanding. In fact, the decline of
traditional insurance markets of the late 1980s and early
1990s actually marked a change in insurance markets that
involved a dramatic increase in some forms of insurance sup-
ply. New state funds and self-insurance structures success-
fully replaced traditional insurers - and traditional insurers
restructured their operations in response to this heightened
competition from more cost-effective providers." These new
insurance forms make those with responsibility for financing
and processing workers' compensation benefit claims more
directly accountable for the costs of those benefits - reducing
insurer moral hazard.
A closer look at this changing insurance market suggests
that another alleged harmful effect of supposed rate suppres-
sion, inadequate loss control, may result from excessive cost
protection for insurers rather than from inadequate insur-
ance rates. Danzon and Harrington's findings of higher
losses in states with large residual markets or greater rate in-
crease denials8 2 may indicate that insurers were particularly
ineffective at controlling costs in states with costly benefits.
Price competition rather than rate regulation may better re-
duce losses not because regulated rates leave insurers with
too little money for loss control, but because regulated rates
pay insurers too much for failing to control losses.
Of course, the reduced losses in the Danzon and Harring-
ton study may simply indicate more denials of legitimate
claims, not necessarily more safety or successful reemploy-
ment of injured workers - and therefore may not benefit
workers." But evidence that deregulating insurance rateset-
ting corresponds with lower injury rates" (rather than simply
lower claims rates) also could suggest that the traditional
regulatory system inflated rather than suppressed insurance
prices. Again, traditional rate regulation may have decreased
safety not because insurers received rates too low to cover
81. See infra Parts III(D) & III(E).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
83. See Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and the Per-
sistence of Occupational Injuries, 31 HOUSTON L. REv., 119, 249-263 (1994) (explain-
ing how incentives for loss control are likely to result in claims prevention rather
than injury prevention).
84. See Ruser & Barkume, supra note 63.
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safety or return-to-work programs, but because insurers
used rate regulation to try to spread the costs of workplace
injuries to others (even though they were not always success-
ful in doing so). By increasing insurers' accountability for the
costs of workplace injuries and illnesses, the restructured in-
surance market may have helped induce more effective loss
prevention measures in some states.
III. ALTERNATIVE STORY OF INSURER MORAL HAZARD
A. Traditional Rate Regulation Before the Crisis
In the prevailing rate suppression theory, regulators
changed insurance pricing during the crisis of the 1980s and
early 1990s from a process based on objective evidence of ac-
tual costs to a process of special-interest politics driven by
employers' demands for affordable rates and workers' de-
mands for benefits.5 A closer look at the pre-existing ap-
proach to workers' compensation insurance pricing shows in-
stead a highly politicized system where insurers orchestrated
and institutionalized government intervention in the market
to further their particular interests. The crisis-era regulatory
controls intervened not in a system of "free market" prices,
but in a system structured to protect insurers from price
competition through state-controlled ratesetting and state-
sanctioned price collusion.
1. Maine's Example of Pre- 1980s Ratesetting
In the 1970s, before it became the leading example of the
crisis period, Maine followed the national trend of expanding
workers' compensation benefit protection. In Maine, as in
many other states, insurers responded to this benefit expan-
sion with a series of price increases. From 1972 through
1981, Maine's workers' compensation insurance rates charg-
ed to employers (before adjustment for industry class and
employers' individual loss experience)" increased an average
85. See KRAMER, supra note 9, at 2, 14.
86. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, RATEMAKING... THE
PRICING OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE 16-17 (1993) (explaining how baseline
average rate changes are adjusted for industry classification and individual employer
experience and discounts).
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of more than 16 percent a year.8 From 1978 to 1981, insur-
ers received three rate increases of 20 percent or more.8"
Before the late 1970s, Maine regulators authorized these
rate increases through a process that basically amounted to
rubber-stamping prices determined by insurers acting in
concert through the nationwide insurance industry associa-
tion, the NCCI. Maine law authorized a state administrative
agency (the Bureau of Insurance) to ensure that insurance
rates were not "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discrimina-
tory."8 9 The NCCI, to which all Maine insurers were required
to belong, submitted insurers' rate requests in the aggregate,
typically in the form of a twenty to thirty page summary of
cost data.90 Maine's Insurance Superintendent raditionally
approved the NCCI's rate requests in a one-page administra-
tive order issued several days after receiving the NCCI's rate
filing with minimal independent state analysis or involvement
from outside parties.9 1
Maine's approach tracked the established regulatory
practices in most states that relied on a private insurance
market for workers' compensation coverage prior to the
1980s. Before 1981, all of these states required prior regula-
tory approval of premium prices.9 2 During this time, thirty-
two states gave the NCCI primary (and typically exclusive) au-
thority to supply cost data and to represent insurers as a
group in rate regulatory proceedings.9 3 A number of other
states have state-specific rating bureaus, similarly made up
87. See National Council on Compensation Insurance, Changes in Manual Pre-
mium Level by State Since 1-1-62, Maine data (Feb. 1984) (unpublished document
submitted to regulators, on file with the author).
88. Id. (20.9% in 1987, 20% in 1979, and 25% in 1981).
89. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2303 (West 2000) (giving current version
of this provision).
90. See Testimony of William Black and Martha McCluskey, [Maine] Public Advo-
cate Office, To the [Maine] Blue Ribbon Commission on Workers' Compensation,
June 8, 1992, at 2.
91. Id.
92. U.S. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: INITIAL EXPERI-
ENCES WITH COMPETITIVE RATING 2 (1986) [hereinafter GAO].
93. Robert W. Klein, Market Effects of Loss Cost Systems in Workers' Compensa-
tion 23 (unpublished draft, Nov. 14, 1991, on file with author). NCCI held this
dominant rate advisor and advocacy position for decades. See MONROE BERKOWITZ,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: THE NEW JERSEY EXPERIENCE 143 (1960) (writing that
through the 1950s NCCI served as insurers' rating agent in all but eight states with
private insurance markets).
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of insurance company members, but many of these worked
closely with the NCCI to share cost and pricing information.9 4
States typically required insurers to belong to the NCCI or a
comparable state-specific rating bureau and to comply with
its standardized practices for data collection. Moreover,
Maine, like other states, required insurers to charge these
regulated, uniform rates, based on statewide aggregate cost
estimates adjusted for industry class and (sometimes) indi-
vidual employer loss experience.9 5 While a few states permit-
ted insurers to offer deviations or discounts for individual
employers on a limited basis subject to prior approval, and
while some insurers paid dividends to policyholders, price
competition in workers' compensation was virtually non-
existent before the 1980s.9 6
2. Development of Regulatory Price Protection
Although this regulatory system was supposed to pro-
tect the public interest,9 7 the historical practice of workers'
compensation insurance regulation developed in substantial
part through self-interested political and legal maneuvering
by insurers and regulators (and others). When workers' com-
pensation was established in the early 1900s, federal anti-
trust laws did not reach private insurers because of a Su-
preme Court ruling denying Congress's authority to regulate
98insurance. As in other lines of insurance, workers' compen-
sation insurers joined together in private membership organi-
zations, called rating bureaus, to fix prices." Insurers formed
the NCCI in 1921 at the time when most states were in the
process of establishing their workers' compensation sys-
tems.'o Throughout the early 1940s, states were largely un-
94. Klein, supra note 93, at 23; see also BERKOWITz, supra note 93, at 143 (ex-
plaining that New Jersey's rating bureau cooperated with the NCCI).
95. See Klein, supra note 93, at 23.
96. See ROBERT W. KLEIN ET AL., MARKET CONDITIONS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION
INSURANCE: INTERIM REPORT PRESENTED TO THE NAIC WORKERS' COMPENSATION (D) TASK
FORCE 26 (July 9, 1993).
97. See infra note 116.
98. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869) (ruling that Congress had no
authority under the commerce clause to regulate insurance).
99. DOUGLAS CADDY, LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN INSURANCE REGULATION 154 (1986) (cit-
ing JOHN G. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S.
Dep't of Transp. 1970)).
100. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 93, at 143.
INSURER MORAL HAZARD
successful in their attempts to enforce state antitrust laws
and other protections against insurers' price fixing.'
In 1944, the Supreme Court changed course and held
that federal antitrust laws did apply to insurance (in a case
alleging anticompetitive activity by a rating bureau).1 0 2 In re-
sponse, however, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson
Act' under pressure from insurers and the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).104 This act gave in-
surers immunity from federal antitrust law "to the extent that
such business is not regulated by state law."105 To activate
this federal immunity, most states adopted insurance regula-
tory systems following an "All Industry" model law developed
by the NAIC in close cooperation with industry officials.'
This legislation allowed insurers' private rating bureaus to
propose premium rates by submitting requested prices with
state regulators for prior approval.0 7
In this system of state-administered uniform pricing,
regulators rarely disapproved insurers' workers' compensa-
tion rates prior to the late 1970s and early 1980s.' In gen-
eral, this regulatory approach had the effect of delegating
state rate setting oversight to the NCCI, or other insurer rat-
ing bureaus, in a system of national industry self-regulation
(or price-fixing) operating in cooperation with the NAIC.109 In
the early years of this system, insurers' actual earnings from
premiums often exceeded reported losses and expenses by
hefty margins."0 From the start, labor and employer critics
raised concerns that insurers were using their protection
101. See CADDY, supra note 99, at 154.
102. United States v. South-eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (ap-
plying Sherman Antitrust Act to insurance rating bureau accused of fixing prices
and boycotting non-members).
103. Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994)).
104. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGUIATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 97 (2d ed. 1995); Spencer L. Kimball, & Barbara P. Heaney, Emasculation
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 1, 9
(citing 91 Cong. Rec. 1085-94 (1945)).
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012 (1994).
106. See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 54 (1987).
107. See CADDY, supra note 99, at 155.
108. See HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKERS' COMPENSATION
105 (1954); Douglas Stevenson, Look Homeward Angels, The Fault for Soaring
Losses, 7 NCCI DIGEST, Feb. 1992, at 7.
109. See SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note 108, at 102.
110. Id. at 110-112; BERKOWrz, supra note 93, at 164-65.
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from competition and from regulatory scrutiny to inflate
prices, thereby draining resources from workers' benefits or
from employers' earnings,"' creating a classic moral hazard
problem. Not surprisingly, when the benefit expansions of
the 1970s led to substantial rate increases, employers, labor
groups, and state officials became more active in questioning
this rating system.
This increased concern about insurer moral hazard from
the administered price-fixing system not surprisingly pro-
duced efforts to reduce regulatory price protections in work-
ers' compensation (following similar deregulation of other in-
surance lines) .112 From 1981 to 1985, ten states eliminated
the prior approval system and introduced some form of com-
petitive rating scheme.1 1 3  Consistent with critics' suspicions
that the traditional system had allowed insurers to capture
the regulatory process to inflate rates, several studies suggest
that these initial deregulation attempts did reduce employers'
insurance prices.H4
However, insurers often defended this administered pric-
ing system, arguing that instead of producing moral hazard,
the protection from price competition was necessary to keep
costs down for both employers and workers due to the special
nature of workers' compensation."' For example, in response
111. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 93, at 171; CADDY, supra note 99, at 174.
112. The NAIC began formally reviewing its model rating laws to promote competi-
tion in 1978. William 0. Bailey, Competitive Rating and Workers' Compensation, 1 J.
INS. REG. lunpaginated manuscript at 4] (1983). In 1983, the NAIC adopted a model
competitive rating act for workers' compensation which recommended replacing prior
approval with a "file and use" system for individual insurers and limiting rating bu-
reaus' role to providing aggregate loss data. Klein ET AL., supra note 96, at 28.
113. GAO, supra note 92, at 2, 12.
114. Id. (finding that from 1982-1984 employers' costs declined more in states
with competitive rating than with prior approval rating); THOMSON ET AL., supra note
13, at 176-81 (evaluating these and other studies and concluding that the evidence
is inconclusive); Anne Carroll & Robert Kaestner, The Relationship Between Regula-
tion and Prices in the Workers' Compensation I surance Market, 8 J. REG. ECON. 149-
66 (1995) (finding tendency toward lower prices in deregulated states from 1980-
1987); H. Allan Hunt et al., The Impact of Open Competition on the Employers' Costs
of Workers' Compensation, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE PRICING 140-41
(David Appel & Philip S. Borba eds. 1988) (finding that Michigan's move to open
competition in 1982 produced a "substantial" savings for employers from 1983-
1985). In a study of the relationship between regulation and employers costs for the
period 1975-1995, Thomason, Schmidle & Burton found decreased employer costs
under comprehensive (but not partial) deregulation. THOMASON ET AL., supra. at 281-
82.
115. See Bailey, supra note 12, at 14] (noting that although most of the prop-
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to an NAIC study recommending open competition in pricing,
Liberty Mutual executive Gary L. Countryman argued that
"the present regulatory system has adequately assured the fi-
nancial integrity of the system and has assured the availabil-
ity and delivery of a high quality product in a way which has
fairly balanced the interests of employers and employ-
ees . . ." " In the conventional rationale for state-
administered pricing, the compulsory nature of workers'
compensation and the third-party interests of workers in se-
cure funding justifies unusual regulatory oversight to prevent
both excessive and insufficient pricing." 7 In addition, many
analysts justify cooperative data collection and rate filing on
the theory that, due to the unique need in workers' compen-
sation insurance for standardized cost information and large
databases, rating bureau monopolies rather than competition
can best reduce premium costs and maintain market stabil-
ity."1
Insurers' arguments defending these regulatory protec-
tions tend to portray insurance costs as beyond insurers con-
trol. Moral hazard only drives up costs when those who are
protected from costs have some control over costs. If insur-
ers' role is simply to finance workers' compensation benefits
by pooling premiums based on actuarial calculations of ex-
pected risk, then protection from competition might produce
the most cost-effective insurance by reducing pressures to
skimp on technical expertise or on high quality data."'9 For
example, the NCCI concluded in a 1952 report that the rate-
making system had largely achieved its goal of establishing
prices on a "scientific and non-competitive" basis.12 0 The rate
erty/casualty industry supported increased competition in other lines, the industry
was significantly split on the question of competition in workers' compensation). In
1989, in response to an NAIC task force on rating bureaus in workers' compensa-
tion, insurers testified in opposition to limiting rating bureau pricing. Klein, supra
note 93, at 4.
116. Gary L. Countryman, Counterpoint: Open Competition Rating for Workers'
Compensation, 1 J. INS. REG. [unpaginated manuscript at 2] (1983).
117. See BERKOWrrz, supra note 93, at 142.; KLEIN ET AL., supra note 86, at 25;
Countryman, supra note 116, at [1].
118. See Klein, supra note 93, at 8-9 (comparing this "service model" of rating or-
ganizations to the "cartel model"); see also DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at
147 (describing possible benefits from promoting insurer cooperation).
119. Countryman, supra note 116, at [3].
120. SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note 108, at 102 & n. 13 (quoting 1952 NCCI An-
nual Report, at 3).
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suppression theory of the 1980s crisis builds on this assump-
tion that insurers passively and neutrally reflect exogenously
determined benefit costs - unless regulators interfere by re-
jecting insurers' rate requests. As one insurance executive
explained in the 1992 New York Times article on Maine's
market collapse, when insurers demand rate increases, they
act simply as the "messengers who deliver the bad news
about what is going on in society."'2 1
But workers' compensation insurance costs are not sim-
ply an exogenous and fixed fact of nature waiting to be dis-
covered. Instead, to a large extent, insurance costs are pro-
duced endogenously. For example, these costs depend on in-
surers' subjective choices made in the process of administer-
ing claims, servicing policies, and gathering, interpreting, and
disseminating highly uncertain information about cost. A
closer look at insurers' opportunities for strategic (or inadver-
tent) influence on insurance costs reveals two forms of moral
hazard.
3. Opportunities for Insurer Cost Inflation
First, under the traditional system, rating bureau control
of highly uncertain data combined with regulatory protection
from price competition probably induced rating bureaus like
the NCCI to increase reported costs. The NCCI's revenue and
payroll has far outstripped that of individual state regulatory
agencies or even the NAIC;1 2 2 these superior resources proba-
bly give it informational advantages over regulators that limit
the effectiveness of regulatory monitoring. Aside from out-
right inaccuracy or fraud, plenty of uncertainty about antici-
pated losses and expenses would have provided ample oppor-
tunities for the NCCI to shape data reporting to support in-
surers' collective interest in seeking high insurance rates.
Compared to other lines of insurance, the long-tailed na-
ture of workers' compensation poses particular challenges for
insurers and regulators attempting to project future costs.
121. Kerr, supra note 1 (quoting Grover Czech, vice president of Maryland Insur-
ance Group, one of the insurers withdrawing from the Maine market in 1992).
122. In 1996, for example, the NCCI had about 1,000 staff and a payroll of more
than $57 million-more than the NAIC's entire budget. Dan Lonkevich, For-Profit
Converston Debate Puts NCCI Under Microscope, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Mar. 31, 1997,
at 3.
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The total costs of losses covered by insurance policies for the
year 1979, for instance, might not be fully known until well
into the twenty-first century, because a worker injured in
that policy year might collect benefits for a permanent injury
over the course of thirty years. Moreover, for ongoing or an-
ticipated claims, reported benefit costs rest on insurers'
highly subjective and changeable practice of reserving, in
which they estimate how much money to set aside for paying
claims made (or expected to be made) during a particular pol-
icy year. Rating bureaus' projections of future losses (benefit
claims) depend on complex assumptions about the relevance
of past experience and the need for adjustments for changes
in the legal and economic environment in which claims are
made.1 2 3 In most states during the 1970s and 1980s, sub-
stantial changes in both legislated benefit levels and in claims
adjudication (such as increased participation by claimants'
attorneys and medical experts) probably increased this uncer-
tainty about claims costs.
Rating bureaus and individual insurers also had plenty of
opportunity under the traditional ratesetting system to in-
crease the amount of reported expenses and profit.124 For ex-
ample, insurers typically reported general overhead expenses
to the NCCI not by submitting any detailed records of actual
expenditures, but by estimating the percentage of country-
wide overhead expenses attributable to workers' compensa-
tion (as opposed to other lines) and to a particular state.125
Moreover, prior to the 1980s, the NCCI factored formulaic
profit allowances into rate requests that had no meaningful
relationship to insurers' expected return on capital.1 26
123. For example, the choice of number of years of historical data, or of state ver-
sus countrywide data can influence projected loss costs. See Robert W. Klein, Regu-
lation, Competition and Profitability in Workers' Compensation Insurance, JOHN
BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR, March/April 1992, at 7, 11, 13 (discuss-
ing uncertainty in ratesetting process).
124. See Meg Fletcher, Bus. INS., Mar. 19, 1990, at 1 (reporting criticism from the
chief casualty actuary working for South Carolina's Department of Insurance that
the "NCCI tends to overestimate expense factors like general expenses, overhead ex-
penses, loss adjustment expenses and assessments for guaranty funds and second-
injury funds," for example by using expense data from more costly stock companies
rather than mutual companies).
125. See KLEIN, ET AL., supra note 96, at 130; McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 2, at
695, n.141.
126. See infra notes 152-60 and accompany text.
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Second, the traditional system of collective ratesetting
and data production seems likely to have encouraged insur-
ers to increase their actual losses and other costs during the
period of benefit expansion that led to the crisis. Insurers
have substantial control not only over their expenses (such as
general overhead and claims processing costs) and profit de-
mands, but also over actual benefit costs. Insurers can chal-
lenge benefit claims more or less aggressively; they can influ-
ence employers' control over benefit claims; and they can
provide information, equipment and training designed to re-
duce benefit claims through safety and re-employment of in-
jured workers. In addition, insurers can alter benefit costs by
using their political power and public relations resources to
change benefit legislation and to stigmatize and otherwise
penalize benefit claims.
Insurers and others sometimes defended the noncompeti-
tive regulatory scheme by acknowledging that price protection
creates incentives that often change insurers' behavior, but
explaining these resulting behavior changes as beneficial.
Based on evidence that the workers' compensation insurance
market was relatively open and unconcentrated, a number of
economists have argued that the cooperative ratesetting
scheme did not eliminate competition but instead shifted the
focus of competition from prices to non-price service.12 7 This
theory reconstructs the higher insurance costs of rate regula-
tion as caused not by insurer moral hazard but by a desirable
improvement in service quality that, in the long run, leads to
lower costs. In particular, some have argued that the tradi-
tional regulatory scheme reduced long-run workers' compen-
sation costs because it encouraged insurers to compete to
provide superior loss control services such as safety and re-
employment programs. 128
127. See Scott Harrington, The Impact of Rate Regulation on Prices and Under-
writing Results in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: A Survey, 51 J. RISK &
INS. 577, 583-84 (1984) (summarizing theoretical and empirical research on nonprice
competition in property and liability insurance in general); Joseph C. Samprone, Jr.,
Rate Regulation and Nonprice Competition in the Property and Liability Insurance In-
dustry, 46 J. RISK & INs. 683 (1979) (finding support for this hypothesis in study of
auto insurance).
128. Countryman, supra note 116; see also DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9,
at 16 (describing pre- 1980s ratesetting as a time when workers' compensation insur-
ers competed on the basis of dividends and "service quality").
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However, others have argued that, in fact, competition for
safety services was more likely to result from price competi-
tion than from price protection. For example, Aetna insurance
executive William 0. Bailey has noted that, in the traditional
administered pricing system, insurers concentrated their
competition for loss control services on large employers, the
only segment of the market where some price competition
had taken place (in the form of special deviations, dividends,
or individualized risk-sharing contracts).2 9
Indeed, before the crisis of the 1980s, the relatively low
and fixed costs of workers' compensation meant many man-
agers often paid little attention to workers' compensation
costs and often purchased workers' compensation as a pack-
age with other forms of commercial insurance."0 Without an
upfront price benefit, and with only an uncertain, indirect,
and long-term payoff from many loss control services, many
employers probably did not devote significant resources to
shopping for improved loss prevention services from insurers.
Experience rating - adjustments to premiums based on an
individual firm's loss experience - is generally only available
for a relatively small group of large employers with at least
several years of loss history and at best only imperfectly
tracks safety (or other loss control) efforts.'3 1 Since many em-
ployers would not likely have the expertise or data sufficient
to identify cheaply expected long-term savings from up-front
loss control measures, insurers probably would have to de-
velop and provide this information and to devote substantial
resources to marketing it to employers to make such services
salient to employers' insurance shopping.
A further look at the pre- 1980s ratesetting system shows
additional problems with this theory of loss-control competi-
tion. In the face of changing benefit laws and rising benefit
129. Bailey, supra note 112.
130. See, e.g., Michael Schachner, National Workers Comp System Looms, Bus.
INS., May 6, 1991, at 62 (reporting risk manager's comment that employers are just
beginning to realize the importance of loss control in workers' compensation); Joanne
Wojcik, The Risk Manager's Many New Hats, Bus. INS., July 23, 1993, at 3 (explain-
ing that the cost of risk was not central to high level corporate management prior to
1980s cost increases).
131. See Spieler, supra note 83, at 189-93 (describing experience rating methods).
Writing in 1983, an insurance executive pegged the portion of experience rated poli-
cyholders at 15% of the workers' compensation market. Bailey, supra note 112.
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costs in the 1970s, insurers probably would not have been
able to compete by improving loss control services, without
devoting increased resources to developing and marketing
new cost containment strategies, based on new information.
In a highly uncertain cost context, higher than average ex-
penses on such service would make it more difficult for in-
surers to predict whether lower profits would be offset by in-
creased market share. It seems likely that many insurers in-
stead followed the easier strategy of relying on regulated price
increases and employers' inattention to their individual losses
to maintain their profits in the face of rising costs. Insurance
defense attorney Douglas Stevenson explained his experience
of insurance managers' typical response to rising benefit
costs:
[Elach year's losses just became the target for next year's
sales revenue. After all, there was a government-mandated
market.... Government fixed the prices on the basis of
figures submitted by the insurance industry and approved
by insurance commissioners. So long as this cycle contin-
ued, management was a pretty simple matter.132
Even though some insurance managers may have taken a
more entrepreneurial approach to loss control in some in-
stances, the traditional system constrained individual insur-
ers' loss control efforts to some extent by limiting not only
price competition but also by limiting competition to produce
high-quality information about losses. Information about
loss patterns can help promote long-term loss prevention ef-
forts like safety and re-employment in workers' compensa-
tion.13 3 With its state-mandated monopoly on data collection
and distribution, the NCCI had opportunities to shape loss
data not only because of its choices about how to project fu-
ture costs from past data in a changing present, but also be-
cause of its choices about what kinds of data about losses
should be produced. The NCCI's (or other rating bureaus')
132. Douglas Stevenson, Look Homeward Angels: The Fault for Soaring Losses, 7
NCCI DIGEST, Feb. 1992, at 17, 18.
133. Meg Fletcher, NCCI Works Against Workers: AFL-CIO, Bus. INS., Nov. 1, 1993,
at 91 (quoting AFL-CIO representative James Ellenberger's comment that "Public
policy makers, regulators and employers as well as workers and their union must
have confidence in the facts and figures collected and used by NCCI and other rating
organizations to price workers' compensation insurance and to give. us important in-
formation about the frequency, nature and source of occupational injuries and ill-
nesses.").
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dual role as ratesetting advocate and "statistical agent" (or in-
formation source) for insurers created particular incentives
for producing information designed not to control costs but to
increase them.
During the crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, critics faulted
the NCCI for producing data rooted in an "outdated" rate car-
tel system.1 3 4 One insurance executive explained:
[Tihe NCCI and other rating bureau] databases were cre-
ated for the sole purpose of supporting insurer efforts to
(collectively) raise rates to match costs. Since rating bu-
reaus are controlled by insurance companies, these data-
bases weren't designed for analyzing cost trends and man-
aging the costs of the system in order to obviate the need
for rate increases. Rating bureaus have no vested interest
in helping employers control workers' compensation costs
(that would limit the growth of their own industry), unless
insurance 3gulators place some limits on their ability to
raise rates.
To address these concerns, in the late 1990s, some state
regulators took steps toward introducing competition into the
data process, for example by putting out to bid the data col-
lection services formerly controlled by the NCCI.13 6  Facing
this competition, the NCCI finally responded to critics by
separating its regulatory and statistical functions into two
subsidiaries.1 3 7  In addition, it offered insurers new forms of
data, for example, by investing in database systems geared
particularly toward improving individual insurers' loss control
efforts - such as a "benchmarking" system that allows insur-
ers to measure outcomes by medical provider and to compare
losses among firms. 131
134. Miles Maguire, NAIC Eyes 'Sweeping' Stat Agent Changes, INS. AccOUNTANT,
Feb. 13, 1995, at 1 (quoting Alan E. Wickman, chair of the NAIC's Statistical Strate-
gic Planning Working Group) ("Regulators have not exercised much control ... over
what data are collected, how the data are collected, or how the compiled data are
made available to regulators and others.").
135. Richard A. Hofmann, The Workers' Compensation Crisis: How to Control Costs
by Managing the System, CONTINGENCIES, Nov./Dec. 1991, at 20.
136. Regulators Need to Set Stage for Competition in Rate Making, 8 WORKERS'
COMPENSATION REP. (BNA) 328 (June 23, 1997) (reporting that first competitor to
NCCI in 70 years had entered the market).
137. Meg Fletcher, Changing Structure: NCCI Reshaping Will Create Three Units,
BUS. INS., May 8, 2000 at, 53.
138. NCCI Buys Industry Benchmarking System, 9 WORKERS' COMP. EXECUTIVE No.
18, Oct. 6, 1999.
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B. 1980s Rate Controls
Proponents of the rate suppression story tend to gloss
over or minimize the anticompetitive nature of the pre- 1980s
system to present the subsequent regulatory controls as po-
litical disruption of market-based pricing."' The rate sup-
pression story implicitly identifies insurers' interest in higher
premium rates with the economic forces of the market. In
that construction, insurers' demands for rate increases are
necessary and neutral - a simple reflection of economic facts
beyond their control. In contrast, the rate suppression story
of the 1980s rate controls identifies regulators' interests (and
the interests of the workers and employers they represent) in
lower premium rates as unnecessary and partisan - a strate-
gic manipulation of political power to avoid cost control.
Once again, by challenging the assumption that insurers
are passive in the face of increasing costs, we can develop an
alternative picture of insurer moral hazard as the problem
behind rate controls. The Maine example of the 1980s rate
controls shows insurers as political actors seeking protection
for excessive rates at the expense of others, rather than as
victims of others' political scapegoating. First, Maine's long
rate freeze during the 1980s resulted in part from insurers'
active struggle for control over the regulatory process. Insur-
ers refused to comply with state demands for meaningful evi-
dence of insurers' earnings, forgoing the regulatory process in
favor of judicial and political intervention. Second, even
when insurers faced substantial losses from continued rate
controls in the mid 1980s, these losses resulted from insur-
ers' choices about doing business in a volatile and regulated
market. Insurers relied on regulatory protection, rather than
on their own loss control efforts, to manage the risk of uncer-
tain benefit costs. In the face of highly speculative insurance
costs, and a regulatory system no longer controlled by insur-
ers, reasonable regulators could be expected to require insur-
139. See e.g., DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 16 (giving little detail about
the pre- 1980s regulatory system but characterizing it as having "competitive pres-
sures" from dividend payments); KRAMER, supra note 9, at 20 (insisting that despite
strict price regulation, pre-1980s workers' compensation regulation promoted com-
petition through dividends and service). Kramer concedes that "most economists"
would now view the prior approval system of the 1950s as "an unnecessary accom-
modation to solvency goals." Id. at 13-14.
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ers to share the risk of uncertain costs.
1. Maine's Early 1980s Ratesetting Controversy
In 1981, Maine's legislature responded to increasing rates
by revising the workers' compensation insurance ratesetting
law. The reforms required the NCCI's rate filings to include
more substantial evidence. In particular, the law required
regulators to change the method of calculating insurers' prof-
its to include consideration of insurers' investment income. 140
The law also included an all-or-nothing provision requiring
the Superintendent of Insurance to either approve or disap-
prove the NCCI's rate request as whole.14 ' A legislative com-
mittee statement explained that this provision aimed to "pro-
hibit the current practice under which the superintendent,
after a public hearing and disapproval of a filing, later ap-
proves a lesser increase, at a point in time substantially after
the filing in question, without the opportunity for cross-
examination and public participation provided by a public
hearing."4 2
With these legislative reforms, however, the ratesetting
process broke down. The NCCI resisted the new require-
ments in its 1982 rate filing by refusing to include data on
investment income in order to show the projected rate of re-
turn on investment expected from its requested rate in-
crease.143 Instead, it continued the traditional industry prac-
tice of simply adding a 2.5 percent "underwriting profit factor"
designed to provide a margin of earnings over underwriting
costs without considering the effect of investment income. *
In addition, the NCCI resisted the attempt in the all-or-
nothing requirement to ensure rational evidence, subject to
public scrutiny, for the rates actually granted. 1 4 5 The 1982
NCCI rate filing provided data supporting a 110.1 percent av-
erage increase, while limiting its formal request, subject o
140. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.39, § 22(3)(B)(1) (repealed).
141. Id. § 22(6) (repealed and replaced by P.L. 1983, c.509 §§ 1, 2).
142. Statement of Fact, Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 760, No. H-254 (109th Legis.,
1979) (cited in Nat'l Council on Compensation Ins. v. Superintendent of Ins., 481
A.2d 775, 781 (Me. 1984)).
143. See Nat'l Council on Compensation I s., 481 A.2d at 779-80.
144. Id. at 779.
145. Id. at 780.
2001] 85
86 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 5:55
the public rate hearing, to an average 27.5 percent increase -
without supporting this lower number.'4 6
After a public hearing in early 1983 involving participa-
tion by the AFL-CIO and several employers, the Superinten-
dent of Insurance denied the NCCI's rate request. The Super-
intendent found that the NCCI had failed to provide sufficient
evidence to support the 27.5 percent figure, and also that the
NCCI had failed to satisfy its statutory burden of proving that
the profit factor included in the rate filing would produce only
a reasonable return on investment (since it failed to include
investment income data).
Rather than submitting a new rate filing that complied
with the Superintendent's standards, the NCCI challenged
the Superintendent's decision in state court. In 1984,
Maine's highest court upheld the Superintendent's decision,
explaining that requiring evidence of investment income was
consistent with the statutory purpose of ensuring that rates
provide insurers with a 'just and reasonable" return.1 4 1 The
court reasoned that the insurance industry can achieve net
profits from investments even when underwriting costs ex-
ceed underwriting income exclusive of interest. ' Further-
more, the court noted that public utility cases had estab-
lished that regulators can properly consider interest income
in determining appropriate rates.150
Maine's example reflects a broader trend during the early
1980s to move insurance ratesetting toward a public utility
ratemaking model where interested parties participated in
scrutinizing underlying cost data and industry performance
and where the goal of ratesetting was to provide a reasonable,
but not excessive, return on capital."' The central issue in
Maine's ratesetting dispute of the early 1980s, how to calcu-
late insurers' profitability, reflects regulators' nationwide
struggle to give insurance ratemaking a more rational, cost-
146. Id. at 778.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 779-80.
149. Id. at 780.
150. Id. at 779-80 (citing Casco Bay Lines v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 390 A.2d
483, 491 (Me. 1978)).
151. For criticism of this move to a public utility model of insurance rate regula-
tion, see KRAMER, supra note 9, at 93-118.
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based ground than it had had traditionally.
Until the 1981 reforms, Maine's workers' compensation
ratesetting formula followed the standard insurance industry
practice of accounting for a fair profit basically by adding up
aggregate underwriting premium income and subtracting ag-
gregate loss costs and operating expenses, and then increas-
ing this underwriting cost ratio by a fixed percentage to give
insurers an earnings margin above net underwriting costs.
The precursor to the NAIC set this "profit and contingency
factor" at 5 percent in 1921, based on negotiation with insur-
ers without any cost-based rationale or supporting data, and
applied it to a range of insurance lines for decades.152 Insur-
ers originally explained that this calculation excluded invest-
ment income in determining insurers' profits because of prac-
tical difficulties and because "investment income is simply
not part of underwriting, it is not the property of policyhold-
ers."15 3
Analyzing property-liability insurance in general in 1973,
economist Paul L. Jaskow noted that this profit factor "ap-
pears to have been picked out of thin air," and described the
technique's exclusion of investment income as "a priori non-
sensical."15 4  Regulators and other critics repeatedly at-
tempted to change this method of determining profitability,
and during the 1970s, many states replaced the 5 percent
underwriting profit factor in at least some lines of insurance
with an analysis of return on net worth including income
from investments. 15 The particularly long-tailed nature of
workers' compensation's makes investment income even more
likely to have a substantial impact on profitability. Especially
in the high-interest rate years of the early 1980s,'5 6 net un-
derwriting losses might nonetheless produce ample insurance
industry profits because of offsetting investment earnings."5
152. See CADDY, supra note 99, at 172 (citing 1947 report of Roy C. McCullough of
the New York Ins. Dept. to the NAIC).
153. Id. at 170 (citing NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS, PROCEEDINGS, at 51
(1921)).
154. Paul L Jaskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability
Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 375, 394 (1973).
155. See CADDY, supra note 99, at 172-75.
156. See id. at 172.
157. See Nat'l Council on Compensation I s., 481 A 2d. at 780 (citing Massachu-
setts Automobile Rating and Accident Prevention Bureau v. Comm'r of Ins., 411
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Indeed, from 1980-1984 (during Maine's ratesetting standoff),
nationwide data on workers' compensation insurance profit-
ability showed a substantial margin of earnings (from pre-
mium and investment income) over losses and expenses.'
Nonetheless, discussions of the rate suppression story
typically adopt insurers' premise that investment income is
irrelevant to insurers' profitability. For example, in their book
criticizing price controls in workers' compensation, Patricia
Danzon and Scott Harrington discuss insurers' financial re-
sults during the crisis period by looking only at net under-
writing results, excluding the investment income that sub-
stantially reduced (although not always eliminated) insurers'
losses.159
In an attempt to defend insurers' resistance to regulatory
scrutiny of profitability, Orin Kramer criticizes the public util-
ity rate of return model for creating incentives to increase
capital.160 He also argues that, unlike utilities, insurers' earn-
ings cannot readily be separated by state or line of business -
most workers' compensation insurers at that time operated
nationally as part of multiline insurance companies.6 1 These
criticisms (and plenty of others) correctly point to shortcom-
ings of regulatory attempts to monitor profitability. Yet these
problems hardly justify insurers' continued use of the even
more irrational traditional profit allowance or the rate sup-
pression story that 1980s regulatory changes replaced rate-
making based on "economics" with ratemaking based on
"politics."
2. Maine's Mid 1980s Rate Caps
When insurers lost their judicial challenge to Maine's
ratesetting revisions in 1984, they resisted complying by mov-
ing much of their business to the residual market pool and
threatening to withdraw from the state entirely unless they
received new protections from the risk of rising benefit costs.
N.E.2d 762, 769-79 (1980)).
158. Burton, 1994 YEAR BOOK, supra note 26, at 1-9 & fig. L (showing overall op-
erating ratio of 90.7 in 1980 and 88.9 in 1982).
159. DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 4, 5, fig. 1-2.
160. KRAMER, supra note 9, at 98.
161. Id at 97.
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During the early 1980s standoff between the state and the
NCCI, no further ratesetting proceedings were completed.
Meanwhile, the sense of crisis had been heightened among
insurers, who feared the mounting costs suggested by the
failed 110.1 percent 1982 rate filing; and among employers
and workers, who feared the accumulated rate increase loom-
ing once the dispute over investment income was resolved.
Anticipating further ratesetting controversies, in 1983, the
legislature amended the rating law to provide for a state
agency, the Public Advocate Office (established to represent
public utility ratepayers) to intervene in workers' compensa-
tion insurance ratesetting and other regulatory proceedings
on behalf of employers.1 6 2
By 1985, the crisis came to a head. In 1985, insurers
had responded to the long period without a rate increase by
refusing to cover 85 percent of the state's employers (repre-
senting 30 percent of the state premium), leaving most of
these businesses in the residual market pool.'63 Nonetheless,
insurers retained many larger companies as policyholders, in
part because some of these were now insured on a retrospec-
tive rating basis which transferred much of the risk onto the
insureds and perhaps also because of the importance of large
businesses to maintaining insurers' market share in other
highly profitable commercial insurance lines.
The state's early 1980s efforts to revise the ratesetting
process to reduce insurer's regulatory capture therefore
ended in failure. Lawmakers responded in early 1985 by tak-
ing a new approach to controlling insurers' moral hazard.16 4
This time, the goal was to substitute market competition for
government ratesetting as a way of restraining insurers' in-
terest in inflating prices.6 5 In addition, lawmakers enacted
benefit cuts in response to insurer and employer lobbying for
162. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.24-A, § 2387-A (West 2000) (current version of this
provision). The author was a staff attorney in the Public Advocate Office from 1989 to
1993.
163. See Black & McCluskey testimony, supra note 90, at 4.
164. See An Act to Improve the Workers' Compensation System and Reform the
Rate-Making Process, P.L. 1985 c. 372, codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.24-A, §
2331-2357 (1985) (repealed).
165. See supra note 114 (discussing deregulation as means to reducing rates in
other states in the 1980s).
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reduced benefit costs. '6 6
To implement the plan for price competition, the 1985
'Workers' Compensation Competitive Rating Act" required in-
surers to file their own rate requests individually and prohib-
ited the NCCI from filing or distributing rate proposals.'6 1 The
1985 law removed the requirement for prior approval of rate
increases and substituted a "file and use" approach that al-
lowed insurers' proposed rate changes to take effect five days
after filing as long as the proposed rates met minimal stan-
dards designed to allow the Superintendent to protect against
insolvency.' In addition, the law gave the state insurance
department somewhat more control over the NCCI-managed
residual market pool.
However, the legislature also enacted a plan for tempo-
rary regulatory control of rates from 1985-1987 as a transi-
tion to a competitive pricing system, given that most employ-
ers were then in the non-competitive residual market where
they were simply assigned to an insurer. This transition plan
led to a further standoff between insurers and regulators that
derailed the deregulation. The law required insurers filing
rate changes to include an 8 percent reduction from the rates
in effect since 1981, the period of the ratesetting standoff; if
insurers failed to file these rate decreases, the law authorized
the Superintendent to promulgate the reduced rates in Au-
gust 1985.169 Next, the law required that these reduced rates
remain in effect through the next year, 1986.170 Finally, the
new law capped rate increases for 1987 and 1988 at 10 per-
cent. 171
These rate controls effectively aimed to keep insurers'
earnings at the level established in 1981 rates, the time of the
last approved rate increase before the stalemate over rateset-
ting evidence. The rate suppression story explains Maine's
failure to grant rate increases from 1981-1986 as the result
of regulatory capture by employers' interests - a government
166. See Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Cas., 985 F.2d 1138, 1146 (1st Cir.
1993) (mentioning insurers' early 1980s lobbying efforts for benefit cuts).
167. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.24-A, § 2338 (repealed).
168. Id. § 2338 (repealed).
169. Id. § 2355 (repealed).
170. Id. § 2355 (3) (repealed).
171. Id. § 2355(4) (repealed).
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attempt to externalize rising benefit costs onto insurers.172
But, again, by broadening the picture to recognize insurers'
control over the pre-existing ratesetting process and resis-
tance to evidence-based rates, these rate limits can instead
be viewed as an imperfect attempt to restrain insurers from
externalizing costs onto employers (and workers).
Maine's 1985 law stated that the purpose of the transi-
tion period of rate controls was to reflect the insurance cost
savings from benefit cuts included in the 1985 law changes
and to account for insurers' investment income not previ-
ously considered in rates."3 The mandatory 8 percent reduc-
tion in 1985, which matched initial actuarial predictions of
expected savings from the laws' benefit cuts, in effect re-
quired insurers to pass on these savings to employers. At
this time, of course, the state was faced with great uncer-
tainty about insurance costs and profitability, due to the
ratesetting stalemate since 1981 and the lack of meaningful
information about insurer earnings under existing rates.
During the 1980-1984 period, workers' compensation insur-
ance rates had fallen on average nationwide, and insurers'
nationwide workers' compensation profits had risen. The
mandated rate caps effectively required insurers to temporar-
ily assume the risk that benefit costs would be greater than
anticipated and that existing rates of return were inadequate.
But once again, the state failed in its efforts to require in-
surers to take more responsibility for the risks of a highly un-
certain benefit system. After the rate caps took effect in
1985, and insurers failed to file the required rate reduction,
the Insurance Superintendent initiated a ratesetting proceed-
ing that for the first time heard insurers' evidence on ex-
pected rates of return and found that the rate decrease would
produce an inadequate (but still positive) aggregate rate of re-
turn for insurers.174 Nonetheless, due to the statutory man-
date, the Superintendent ordered the rate reduction.
Insurers were not powerless victims in the face of this ex-
pected rate inadequacy, however. They pursued two strate-
172. See Kerr, supra note 1.
173. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.24-A, § 2355 (2) (repealed).
174. Nat'1 Council on Compensation Ins. v. Superintendent of Ins., Docket No. CV-
85-459, at 8-9 24; (Kennebec Cnty. Super. Ct. May 14, 1987) (discussing this regula-
tory proceeding) [hereinafter 1987 Superior Court Decision].
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gies of resistance. First, insurers challenged the decision in
court as an unconstitutional confiscation of their property
and denial of due process."' Second, they began to withdraw
from the market, refusing residual market servicing as well as
continuing to abstain from voluntary market underwriting
and to lobby for further law changes.
In 1987, a Maine Superior Court judge ruled that, even if
the statute deprived insurers of a reasonable opportunity to
earn a profit on future business, there was no constitutional
violation.1 76 The court reasoned that insurers were free to
avoid expected losses by withdrawing from the workers' com-
pensation market in Maine by simply complying with Bureau
of Insurance filing requirements.17  The court further rea-
soned that, unlike electric utilities with high sunk capital
costs, insurers could escape the risk of confiscatory rates by
exiting the state's market at relatively little cost. "Their with-
drawal leaves no useless wires in the air, pipes in the ground
or power plants on the land."'7  The court ruled, however,
that if an insurer chose to withdraw from the market as a
whole, the state could not require that insurer to participate
in residual market servicing (thereby remaining subject to
pooled residual market losses) at rates insufficient to provide
a reasonable return. 1 7 9
In response, insurers stepped up their efforts to withdraw
from the market,8 o while lobbying state lawmakers to reduce
benefit costs and rate controls. In 1987, again facing a col-
lapsed market, Maine repealed the 1985 law and enacted a
new law that imposed new benefits, eliminated the never-
implemented competitive rating plan and reinstated the pre-
1985 ratesetting process.'8' Meanwhile, the NCCI and several
individual insurers appealed the Superior Court decision to
the state's highest court, which ruled that the case was moot
because of the 1987 law changes and because the insurers
had not pled or presented evidence of confiscation under the
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id at 36.
178. Id. at 37.
179. Id. at 43.
180. See AIU Ins. Co. v. Superintendent. of Ins., 600 A.2d 1115, 1116 (Me. 1991).
181. P.L. 1987, chs. 559-60.
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1985 law before the 1987 changes.182 After this ruling, a
group of insurers again sued to challenge the 1985 law, this
time presenting evidence of losses, but the Maine Supreme
Court ruled that their claims were barred by res judicata be-
cause they could have been asserted in the earlier appeal.'83
In the end, although it is likely that at least some insur-
ers lost money under Maine's mid 1980s rate caps, those in-
surers made a business choice to assume the risk of operat-
ing in the regulated market under conditions where employ-
ers had asserted political power to hold down rates and where
most insurance was written in the residual market pool. In
the New York Times report on Maine's crisis, the chair of the
American International Group (AIG, one of the largest na-
tional insurers) complained that his company paid $61 mil-
lion for its share of Maine's residual market losses in 1987,
despite collecting a far smaller amount in voluntary market
premiums that year. He did not say whether his company
earned residual market servicing fees, which would have pro-
vided substantial opportunities for gains that might partially
offset residual market losses (typically ignored in discussions
of rate suppression)." Nor did he explain why he took the
risk of assuming those pooled residual market losses if he be-
lieved rates were inadequate or that his voluntary market
earnings would be small - especially given the pool's incen-
tives for driving up costs, discussed in the next section.
The rate suppression story of this rate cap period as-
sumes that insurers, but not workers and employers, have
the right to do business on their terms. The lesson of this
story is that states must face the tough choice, dictated by
the economics of limited resources, between workers' interest
in adequate benefits and employers' interest in affordable
rates. This story claims that by attempting to control rates to
satisfy both at once, states externalized costs onto insurers
and, in the end, hurt both workers and employers by bringing
the insurance market to collapse - the regulatory moral haz-
ard problem. This lesson assumes that workers can (and
182. Nat'1 Council on Compensation Ins. v. Superintendent of Ins., 538 A.2d 759
(Me. 1988).
183. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins., 600 A.2d. 1115 (Me. 1991).
184. Kerr, supra note 1 (quoting Maurice Greenberg).
185. See id.
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should) bear the risk of losses from inadequate benefits as
the price of a job; or that employers can (and should) bear the
risk of losses from high insurance costs as the price of doing
business under a mandatory workers' compensation scheme.
In contrast, this lesson implies that insurers should not bear
the risk of losses from inadequate rates as the price of doing
business in a regulated market responsive to the political in-
terests of workers and employers as well as insurers.
Why aren't insurers' interests as expendable as workers'
and employers' interests? Because the rate suppression story
constructs insurers, but not employers and workers, as hav-
ing (and deserving) the economic and political power to shape
the market in their favor. When insurers try to avoid the
tough choice between forgoing business in a state and as-
suming the risk of inadequate rates, this story assumes they
are not denying the economic reality of scarce resources but
instead are reflecting the economic reality that insurance
market supply depends on satisfying insurers' price de-
mands. But, contrary to this story's assumption, these in-
surer interests were not quite so inevitable. Looking next at
how the Maine market changed in response to further insurer
demands for risk protection shows that insurance markets
can be differently constructed. Although the Maine example
shows critics are right that rate controls that hurt insurers
are likely to backfire, Maine's later experience shows that this
failure may be a result of insufficient and ineffective rather
than excessive restraints on insurers' interest in rate infla-
tion.
C Residual Market Crisis
1. Residual Market Growth
The "explosion"18 6 of residual markets in the 1980s and
early 1990s in many states seems to present strong evidence
of rate suppression during that period.18 7 For the thirty-three
states using the NCCI as data source and residual market
186. Burton, 1994 YEAR BOOK, supra note 26, at 1-9.
187. KRAMER, supra note 9, at 80 ("residual market deficits indicate inadequate
rates"); Burton, 1994 YEAR BOOK supra note 26, at 1-9.
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manager during this period, the share of premium insured
through residual market pools increased steadily from 16.3
percent in 1986 to a peak of 24.7 percent in 1992.1"8 More
striking than these aggregate figures, however, are data
showing residual markets of more than 50 percent in five
states in 1992 (Maine, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Louisi-
ana and New Mexico) and several others with a residual mar-
ket insuring more than 30 percent of total premium. 189 In
Maine, the vast majority of employers were insured through
the "residual" market from at least 1986 through the end of
1992 (when the residual market was restructured as a self-
supporting quasi-state fund).190
In their book criticizing rate controls, Danzon and Har-
rington explain:
The major cause of large residual markets is the inade-
quacy of regulated prices, which prevents voluntary market
supply to employers insured in the residual market. In a
competitive environment without significant regulatory re-
strictions on price, there is little reason to expect that a
significant proportion of employers will be persistently un-
able to find coverage at any price; that is, relatively few em-
ployers are chronically uninsurable.19 1
Similarly, Orin Kramer asserts, "Large residual markets
for workers' compensation insurance are caused primarily by
restrictions on overall rate increases in the presence of in-
creasing claims costs."l92 These conclusions seem to be a
simple application of basic principles of supply and demand:
other things being equal, inadequate prices will decrease
supply.
188. Burton, 1994 YEAR BOOK, supra note 26, at 1-9 fig. M (using NCCI data). In
1980, the residual market was 12% of total premium; during a period of increased
profitability for workers' compensation insurance from 1981-84, the residual market
share fell to a low of 5.5%. Id. See also DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 6 fig.
1-3 (using slightly different method to show a residual market peak of just under
30% in 1992).
189. See DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 7 fig. 1-4.
190. See 1987 Superior Court Decision, supra note 174, at 12 (citing reports that
about 76% of employers were insured through the residual market in April 1986 and
85% in 1987). Even after 1992, a large portion of employers have remained in the
"residual market" system. See infra text accompanying note 310 (discussing
MEMIC's large market share).
191. DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 15. They acknowledge that, in addi-
tion to rate suppression, some growth during the crisis period in the residual mar-
ket's share of total market premium resulted from higher residual market rates and
lower voluntary market rates. Id. at 14.
192. KRAMER, supra note 9, at 84.
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If regulation caused excessive profits due to insurer
moral hazard, then why would insurance supply have de-
clined so dramatically in states like Maine? Growing residual
markets represented a change in private commercial insur-
ance supply during the crisis period, not just a decline in
voluntary market coverage. In the early 1980s in Maine,
while insurers unsuccessfully battled the state for control
over ratesetting standards, insurers sought temporary protec-
tion from the risk of rising costs by moving many of their
policies into the residual market. No doubt the ensuing 1985
law reforms could have induced insurers to increase their
voluntary market writings if these reforms had satisfied in-
surers' demand for sufficiently high regulated rate increases
in place of rate controls and eventual price competition. Yet
many insurers in Maine presumably made calculated choices
not to withdraw their business from the state, but to switch
their Maine business from underwriting to residual market
servicing. In the mid 1980s, reasonable insurers and regula-
tors probably perceived not so much that rates were clearly
inadequate but that the costs of the Maine market were
highly uncertain, after a period of expanding benefits followed
by the 1985 benefit cuts. Compared to the potentially high
underwriting risks of the voluntary market, the residual mar-
ket offered some insurers the potential for virtually guaran-
teed high short-run profits with deferred and diluted risk. 193
As was typical in most states, Maine had traditionally re-
quired insurers licensed to write workers' compensation in-
surance in the state to participate in the "assigned risk plan"
or "residual market pool." Up until the 1985 law reforms,
Maine law authorized the NCCI to manage Maine's assigned
risk pool as part of the NCCI's National Workers' Compensa-
tion Reinsurance Pool (NWCRP) (which also operated the as-
signed risk pools of most other states). "' Unlike typical rein-
surance, in which the reinsurer assumes a portion of an in-
193. See Brief of the Public Advocate, Re: Workers' Compensation Rate Adjust-
ment, Maine Bureau of Ins. Docket No INS-90-60, June 10, 1991 at 69-70 [hereinaf-
ter 1991 Public Advocate Brief] (citing Milliman & Robertson study describing how
high servicing fees can create cross-subsidies from voluntary market insurers to re-
sidual market insurers).
194. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.24-A, § 2325(1) (1974); see also REPORT OF THE [MAINE]
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM 8 (April 1991) (Susan M.
Collins, Chair).
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surers' risk, the NCCI's NWCRP assumed the entire under-
writing risk for assigned risk policies. If pool losses exceeded
pool gains for a particular policy year in a particular state,
the NCCI assessed insurers a percentage based on their
share of the "voluntary" market in that state.1 95 As long as
the pool was a small - truly "residual" - portion of the mar-
ket, any losses in the pool would be likely to have a relatively
small impact on any particular insurer.
In the traditional NWCRP in the 1980s, the NCCI as-
signed residual market policies on a voluntary non-
competitive basis to insurers.9 6 Individual insurers assigned
to cover pool policies as "servicing carriers" did not bear the
risk associated with that policy (except as spread across pool
members generally), but instead simply performed the admin-
istrative functions of collecting premium and processing
claims. Insurers acting as servicing carriers retained a fixed
percentage of premium collected from employers as an up-
front "servicing fee" to cover their expenses of administering
the policies. The NCCI traditionally set the fee at 30 percent
of premium. Servicing carriers remitted the remaining 70
percent of premium to the pool where the NCCI invested and
managed the funds used to pay out benefit claims.
Maine's 1985 law reforms failed to reduce the residual
market in Maine not simply because of rate controls, but be-
cause these reforms retained - and even increased - incen-
tives for insurers to remain in the residual market as servic-
ing carriers to ensure insurance coverage in the anticipated
transitional period before deregulation. The 1985 reforms
separated Maine's residual market from the NCCI's national
pool and gave the state Insurance Bureau regulatory power
over the pool (although the Insurance Bureau delegated most
management responsibilities to the NCCI). In 1985 in Maine,
the NCCI negotiated with the state Insurance Bureau to in-
crease the servicing fee to 40 percent to keep insurers in the
residual market, a level that probably provided servicing car-
riers with lavish short-term gains.
This fee level was far higher than the amounts insurers
195. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, RESIDUAL MARKET OVERVIEW:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RESIDUAL MARKET (1994).
196. Hofnann, supra note 135, at 24.
2001]1 97
98 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 5:55
typically spent on expenses, particularly for pool policies, 1
and particularly when pool policies were no longer limited to
the most costly risks in a class.' After Maine's 1987 reforms
offered alternative inducements to keep insurers in the resid-
ual market, Maine's Insurance Superintendent reduced its
residual market servicing carrier fees from 40 percent to 30
percent in 1988 and then to 25.6 percent in 1989.199 In a
1991 Maine ratesetting proceeding, the Public Advocate's ac-
tuarial witness, Allan I. Schwartz, calculated that the 25.6
percent servicing allowance would allow a 50 percent return
on investment for servicing carriers based on a generous es-
timate of capital requirements.2" And competitive servicing
firms that handled Maine's self-insured business in the
1990s often charged about 11.5 percent of premium for com-
parable (or even far superior) claims processing, loss control,
financial management, and general administrative services.201
The growth of residual market pools, therefore, might be
evidence of excessive prices in these pools - for servicing, not
for underwriting - rather than of inadequate insurance prices
in the general voluntary market. Insurers decided whether to
stay in Maine's predominantly residual market by considering
the opportunities for gain from servicing fees.202 Of course,
these servicing gains were offset by the long term risk of as-
sessments for residual market deficits, so that insurers were
likely to use residual market servicing only as a temporary
and partial strategy for avoiding the risks of underwriting.
For example, in 1987 Maine's insurers again decided to with-
draw from the market as a whole under the rising threat of
residual market deficits combined with the judicial ruling
that rate controls could not be confiscatory if insurers could
197. See id.
198. See 1991 Public Advocate Brief, supra note 193, at 69-70 (arguing that the
NCCI overstated Maine's residual market expenses by using national expense figures
developed for small, high-risk residual markets).
199. See id at 57 n.13.
200. Id. at 64.
201. Testimony of Ted Jellison for the Maine School Management Ass'n, Workers'
Compensation 1992 Rate Filing Hearings, Me. Bureau of Ins. Docket No. INS 91-66
[hereinafter 1992 RATE HEARINGS], transcript at 399; see also infra note, 342 (noting
that NCCI's servicing fees dropped 35% when later opened to competitive bidding).
202. See 1991 Public Advocate Brief, supra note 193, at 56 (citing testimony of
Travelers' Ins. Co.).
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leave.20 3 Again, however, rather than carrying out threats to
withdraw from the state, insurers worked with state lawmak-
ers to design an alternative set of protections for insurer
profit.204
Perhaps more important than individual insurers' oppor-
tunity for short-term profit from servicing fees, residual mar-
kets offered another longer-term opportunity for insurers to
increase their share of the gains from the system. Residual
markets offered insurers in the aggregate a kind of market
share "insurance" that offered them some of the benefits of a
regulated market - freedom from competitive pressures,
guaranteed customers, and short-term profit protection -
without some of the risks of newly enhanced rate controls.
By shifting their business into the residual market, individual
servicing carriers and the NCCI avoided ceding the state's in-
surance market to competitors, particularly to new alterna-
tive insurance forms such as state funds or self-insurance
pools.
205
Although the large residual market's risk protection was
necessarily short-lived,206 its unstable nature gave private
commercial insurers the political leverage to extract further
concessions from state lawmakers and competing political in-
terests (employers and workers). In Maine in 1987 and again
in 1991 and 1992, the state's reliance on a collapsing and
costly residual market as the dominant insurance source cre-
ated an immediate crisis that made it more difficult for state
lawmakers and regulators to resist insurers' pressure for
benefit cuts or rate increases. If insurers had simply left the
market at the start of the 1985 rate controls, waiting out the
crisis period for higher rates or reduced benefits, they would
have run the risk that competitors with better cost-control
would prove that the problem was the inefficiency of the tra-
ditional insurance system, not inadequate rates. In Maine,
employers brought a federal antitrust action claiming that in-
203. See Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Cas., 985 F.2d 1138, 1142 (1st Cir.
1993); see also AIU Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins., 600 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Me.
1991) (denying insurers' claim for damages due to confiscation from 1985 rating law
on grounds of res judicata).
204. See infra note 230 (discussing "Fresh Start" provision).
205. See infra Parts III D. & E.
206. See infra (Part III (C)(3).
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surers, through the NCCI, colluded to use withdrawal threats
in an illegal boycott to force the state to enact unreasonable
price hikes. The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit rejected these claims on the ground the alleged harm
was caused by legislative action exempt from antitrust law.2 07
2. Residual Market Deficits
Nonetheless, the rate suppression story points to the evi-
dence of large residual market operating deficits in Maine and
elsewhere during the crisis period to show that insurers were
the victims, not the beneficiaries, of residual market growth.
For example, Orin Kramer argues that the total nationwide
deficit for NCCI-run residual markets, at $2.3 billion for pol-
20
icy year 1990, shows severe rate suppression.208 Once again,
Maine was the leading example of this problem. In 1992, in-
surers estimated Maine's residual market deficit at $574 mil-
lion.209
However, the conventional assumption that high residual
market deficits in the 1980s reflect rate suppression during
that time oversimplifies the picture. These deficits resulted
from insurers' cost-increasing actions as well as (or even
more than) from government attempts to keep insurance "af-
fordable," as Kramer charges.2 0 First, deficit projections re-
lied on highly uncertain information primarily in the NCCI's
control; the NCCI's projections may have exaggerated these
deficit projections in order to support its case for rate in-
creases or benefit cuts (later data showed the Maine deficit at
less than half the 1992 estimate).2 1 1 Nonetheless, substan-
tial deficits undoubtedly existed in many of the NCCI-run
pools.
Second, and more importantly, substantial operating
deficits could arise from excessive residual market costs
rather than from inadequate rates. By acting as "insurance"
for insurers who write policies in the pool, the NCCI-man-
207. Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Cas., 985 F. 2d 1138 (1st Cir. 1993).
208. KRAMER, supra note 9, at 80; see also DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at
18-19 (discussing high residual market deficits).
209. Kerr, supra note 1.
210. See id. (quoting Kramer).
211. See infra Part III (C)(3) (discussing final residual market deficit settlement of
$220 million).
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aged residual market pool system used in most states created
potential for insurer moral hazard. Individual servicing carri-
ers retained substantial control over costs associated with
their policies in the pool, but the pool spread the losses asso-
ciated with those policies to insurers generally. Servicing
carriers' effectiveness in calculating correct premium charges
for a policy and in collecting that premium affected the pool's
income. Most critically, their effectiveness in providing loss
control services to improve safety and return-to-work policies
and in processing claims could have a major impact on the
pool's loss costs. Yet servicing carriers made more money the
less they spent on servicing: their profit came from whatever
was left from their up-front servicing fee after servicing ex-
penses. And high servicing fees (typically higher than re-
ported expense levels for voluntary market policies) meant
less premium income available for the pool to cover the un-
derwriting losses (benefit claims).
In addition, the NCCI as pool manager had substantial
control over the costs of residual market pools through deci-
sions about investing pool funds and overseeing servicing
performance, but was subject to little or no regulatory over-
sight in these functions and, as an entity, bore no direct re-
sponsibility for any pool operating losses. Before 1993, the
NCCI did not require insurers who acted as pool servicing
carriers to bid for this business nor to submit to any mean-
ingful system for enforcing performance standards.21 2 Com-
panies active in servicing the pool often played a major role
on the NCCI's NWCRP Board of Governors, which had au-
thority to set the servicing fee and to monitor pool servicing.2 1 3
"The NWCRP [NCCI's residual market pool] functions simply
as a cost pass-through mechanism in which safety require-
ments are not enforced; there are no underwriters to ensure
that rates are adequate to cover expected costs for each em-
ployer and investment income is not used to offset claim
212. See Hofmann, supra note 135, at 24; see also testimony of Lew Hayden,
1992 Rate Hearing, supra note 201, at 739-40 (employer representative to the board
charged with governing Maine's residual market pool, explaining that the NCCI's
oversight of servicing carriers is "like the wolves checking out Grandma's house for
Little Red Riding Hood."). See also infra note 336 and accompany text (discussing
the NCCI's changes to these policies under pressure from competition).
213. Hofmann, supra note 135, at 24.
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costs."214
In short, the lack of accountability for pool costs, com-
bined with incentives for profiting through poor cost man-
agement, encouraged insurers and the NCCI to take little care
to reduce residual market costs.2 1 5 As a result, residual mar-
ket pools would be likely to experience shortfalls under rates
designed to be adequate for the more cost-effective voluntary
market. Residual market underwriting losses may show not
that regulators artificially suppressed rates below "real costs,"
but that insurers' actions, due to the costs protection struc-
tured into the NCCI's residual market design, "artificially" in-
flated pool costs above what a competitive market would have
produced.2 1 6  An insurance executive who analyzed cost
trends in the 1980s reported that in states where the NCCI's
NWCRP operated the residual market, "costs were generally
much higher than in states where state-run insurance com-
panies (state funds) served as the 'market of last resort."'2 17
3. Residual Market Death Spiral
In the rate suppression story, inadequate rates caused
several state markets to reach the brink of collapse as mount-
ing residual market deficits combined with a shrinking volun-
tary market created a "death spiral." Assessments for resid-
ual market pool losses act as a kind of tax on voluntary mar-
ket earnings that makes underwriting less profitable for in-
surers, therefore creating additional incentives for insurers to
reduce their voluntary market exposure even more. As the
residual market increases, along with the possibility of even
more deficit assessments, insurers have incentives to further
reduce their voluntary market exposure and then to leave the
market altogether.
But this death spiral process follows from perverse incen-
214. Id.
215. See KRAMER, supra note 9, at 85 ("large residual markets generally involve
pooling of claim costs across insurers and may affect insurer incentives for investi-
gating and monitoring claims.").
216. "The expansion of these [residual market) plans is not caused solely by in-
adequate voluntary market rates. In states where the [NCCI].... administers the
National Workers' Compensation Reinsurance Pool (NWCRP), overall cost increases
and high residual market burdens have been unnecessarily high." Hofmann, supra
note 135, at 24.
217. Id.
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tives of the residual market system and not necessarily from
rate inadequacy. Once a badly managed residual market
reaches a certain size, rates that amply or even lavishly cover
projected voluntary market risks in a state may not be suffi-
cient to entice insurers back into the voluntary market be-
cause of the disproportionate risk of assessment for residual
market deficits. Although servicing carrier profits may offset
that risk, once the number of insurers in the market as a
whole begins to shrink, the potential for bearing a large share
of pool costs will threaten to outweigh the gains from servic-
ing - and will come due after those gains have been collected.
By portraying rate adequacy as the answer to the death
spirals in workers' compensation insurance markets in the
1980s and early 1990s, the rate suppression story leaves out
the central problem. Maine's example shows how increasing
rates and reducing benefits failed to solve the insurance mar-
ket crisis. Instead, Maine's insurance market crisis persisted
until the state restructured the residual market to avoid its
incentives for moral hazard and self-destruction.
Insurers used the temporary risk protection of the resid-
ual market combined with Maine's unusually high servicing
fees to maintain their market control during the period of
controversy over rate regulation from the early 1980s until
1987, when the state court upheld the 1985 rate controls.
Because that court ruling dashed insurers' hopes of judicial
protection from the risks of residual market liability, insurers
followed an alternative strategy for protection against the un-
certain costs of insurance in the state. While making plans
to withdraw from the market in 1987,218 insurers sought legis-
lative intervention to reduce their risks.
Faced with the collapse of the market, the state legisla-
ture responded to insurers' demands by repealing the 1985
reforms and enacting a different set of comprehensive benefit
and insurance reforms.2 19 These 1987 reforms aimed to re-
duce insurers' costs by restricting benefits. In addition, these
reforms eliminated benefit caps as well as the deregulation
218. See supra text accompanying note 203.
219. An Act to Improve the Maine Workers' Compensation System, P.L. 1987, chs.
559-560 (repealing in its entirety the 1985 Rating Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.24-A,
§§ 2331-57.).
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plan so that the Insurance Superintendent was once again
authorized to set rates "based only on a just and reasonable
profit."2 2 0
Under the new law, in 1988, the first full ratesetting pro-
ceeding since 1981, a new superintendent allowed a 25 per-
cent rate increase (raised to 30 percent for high-risk residual
market policies) after counting estimated savings from benefit
cuts of 41.9 percent.2 2 ' The superintendent noted that a
higher increase might have been authorized had the NCCI
presented better evidence of its costs.2 2 2 The superintendent
granted a second increase of 22.5 percent in 1989,223 and an-
other of 4 percent in 1990.224 In 1991, state lawmakers, again
under threat of a collapsing insurance market and with heavy
lobbying by insurers, enacted an additional package of bene-
fit cuts. 2 2 5 In the 1991 ratesetting proceeding, the superin-
tendent estimated the cost savings from these reforms at 15.3
percent, but reduced insurance rates only 5.8 percent based
on findings that insurers' costs were somewhat higher than
previously expected.22 6 When these changes failed to solve the
insurance crisis, in 1992 state lawmakers enacted a much
more dramatic and comprehensive system of benefit reforms.
In the 1992 rate proceeding, the superintendent estimated
those benefit cuts would save insurers 16.1 percent; along
with this savings, the superintendent authorized a rate in-
227crease of 8.9 percent.
But benefit cuts and rate increases designed to improve
220. See National Council on Compensation Ins. v. Superintendent of Ins., 538
A.2d 759, 768 (Me. 1988).
221. In re: Workers' Compensation Voluntary and Residual Market Rate Proceed-
ing, Docket #INS-88-1 (Me. Bureau of Ins. April 27, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Rate De-
cision].
222. Id. at 12 (chiding the NCCI for failing to present witnesses knowledgeable
about the data).
223. In re: Workers' Compensation Voluntary and Residual Market Rate Proceed-
ing, Docket No. INS-88-2, (Me. Bureau of Ins. Mar. 16, 1989).
224. Workers' Compensation Voluntary and Residual Market Rate Proceeding,
Docket No. INS-89-2, (Me. Bureau of Ins. April 17), 1990 [hereinafter 1990) Rate De-
cision].
225. An Act to Make Changes in the Workers' Compensation System, P.L. 1991,
ch. 615.
226. In re: Workers' Compensation 1991 Rate Filing, Docket No. INS-90-60, (Me.
Bureau of Ins. Sept. 30, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Rate Decision] at 2, 14.
227. In re Workers' Compensation 1992 Rate Filing, Docket No. INS-91-66, (Me.
Bureau of Ins. Nov. 16, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Rate Decision].
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rate adequacy could not stabilize (or even improve) Maine's
insurance market after 1987 because the central problem
was the risk of residual market deficits. The fact that virtu-
ally the entire market consisted of the poorly managed resid-
ual market created a kind of collective action problem. If in-
surers acted collectively to take advantage of potential profit
opportunities, many or most policies could be profitably writ-
ten in the voluntary market. But each individual insurer
would nonetheless avoid re-entering the voluntary market out
of fear that they would be stuck with a share of the residual
market deficit that far outstripped any profits, if other insur-
ers stayed out.2 2 8
Recognizing this problem, and working with insurers'
lobbyists to come up with a deal that would satisfy them, in
1987 state lawmakers established a new residual market
pool 22 9 managed by the NCCI under (nominal) state supervi-
sion. The critical "Fresh Start" provision for this pool offered
insurers the central protection they had been seeking: the
opportunity to avoid the risk of residual market deficits. Be-
ginning with policies written in 1988, any deficits incurred in
the pool would be assessed not to insurers, but to employers
(policyholders), through retroactive premium surcharges.2 3 0
Correspondingly, any pool gains (premium and investment
income exceeding benefits and expenses) would be credited
retroactively to employers. In exchange for this new risk pro-
tection, the "Fresh Start" law required insurers to make "good
faith efforts" to depopulate the residual market pool. 2 3 1 Ifthey
failed to do so, the Superintendent of Insurance was author-
ized to charge up to 50 percent of any residual market deficit
228. For example, one executive of a multistate business testified in a Maine rate
proceeding that the insurer that covered his business in other states refused to pro-
vide a policy for his Maine business even under a "retrospectively rated" policy where
his business would assume a major share of the underwriting risk. 1992 Rate Hear-
ings, supra note 201, at Record of Proceedings Vol. VI p. 734 (testimony of Lew Hay-
den, co-founder of San Antonio Shoe). The insurer refused the policy not because of
the expected costs of insuring that business, but to avoid having a Maine license
that would open it to the risk of residual market assessments. Id.
229. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.24-A, § 2366.
230. Id. § 2367. Rhode Island also adopted a "Fresh Start" provision to protect
insurers from residual market risk (requiring employers to assume 90% of residual
market deficit liability in 1992 and 75% in 1993). See THOMASON ET AL., supra note
13, at 2.
231. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2367(2)(C).
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to insurers, beginning with 1989 policies to allow for some
transition time.2 3 2
This deal basically envisioned a brief transition period
where employers would effectively act as reinsurers, assum-
ing the risk of residual market losses, until insurers could re-
establish the voluntary market - which was made more at-
tractive due to new benefit cuts and rate increases. The
Fresh Start law worked to temporarily prop up the residual
market, but failed miserably as a long term solution to
Maine's workers' compensation insurance crisis. This 1987
reform strategy failed because it exacerbated rather than
eliminated the incentives for insurer moral hazard in the re-
sidual market, not because Maine's rates were insufficient to
cover voluntary market costs. Despite repeated rate in-
creases and benefit cuts, the 1987 "Fresh Start" plan not only
failed to restore the voluntary market but also set the stage
for a second and more severe "death spiral" that brought
Maine into the national spotlight for its supposed rate sup-
pression. By 1990, the residual market constituted about 87
percent of the total premium in the Maine market;23 3 the re-
sidual market share remained near or above that level during
the entire period the 1987 "Fresh Start" law reforms remained
in effect.
Once again, insurers responded by taking advantage of
the 1987 reforms' latest grant of government protection from
risk - the new system of employer reinsurance - while resist-
ing the state's efforts to require that insurers use this protec-
tion to benefit others as well. Although many insurers (not
all) revoked their withdrawal plans after Maine's 1987 re-
forms, most concentrated on remaining in the residual mar-
ket as servicing carriers rather than on using their temporary
freedom from residual market deficits to return to the volun-
tary market once benefit cuts and rate increases had taken
effect. The NCCI, with approval of the state Insurance Super-
intendent, granted one insurer (a subsidiary of the American
International Group) permanent protection from risk (includ-
ing immunity from penalties for failure to repopulate the pool)
232. Id. (setting schedule of increasing penalities based on percentage of voluntary
market underwriting).
233. 1992 Rate Decision, supra note 227, at 2.
INSURER MORAL HAZARD
as a special inducement to service a large northern portion of
the state that other carriers did not want.2 3 4
By requiring employers to "insure" insurers against the
risk of residual market losses, the new "Fresh Start" system
gave servicing carriers (with the help of the NCCI) even more
incentives to seek profits through reduced servicing quality at
the expense of pool funds. Although the 1987 reforms shifted
to employers a substantial portion of the costs of the pool,
these reforms left the control over pool costs largely in the
self-regulating hands of insurers and the NCCI, which basi-
cally continued the traditional practices it used in its other
pools.2 35 The state created a governing board for the pool with
twelve insurer representatives (elected by insurers) and three
employer representatives (appointed by the state Insurance
Superintendent). The three employer representatives lacked
sufficient voting power to shape pool policy2 36 and often were
denied timely access to pool information;2 3 7 one employer
representative described the Board as a "very sad, sorry
joke."2 3 8
From the start of this new residual market system, regu-
lators found evidence that insurers' poor management in-
flated insurance costs. In the 1988 rate proceeding, the NCCI
admitted insurers had sometimes reduced or even eliminated
safety engineering and other loss control services to compen-
sate for (prior) underwriting losses.23 9 However, at that time
the Superintendent of Insurance reasoned that as the new
benefit cuts and rate increases of the 1987 law reforms were
beginning to take effect, "carriers should now have the re-
sources to devote to safety."2 4 0 But then in the 1990 rateset-
ting proceeding, the superintendent of Insurance found "am-
234. See 1990 Rate Decision, supra note 224, at 9. For a story about a subcon-
tractor in that deal who made lucrative profits with disastrous servicing perform-
ance, see Donald M. Kreis, The 'King' of Workers' Comp, 23 ME. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1991,
at 2.
235. See 1992 Rate Hearing, supra note 201, at transcript p. 743 (testimony of
Lew Hayden).
236. See id. at VI Record of Proceedings 702 (testimony of Mitchell Sammons, em-
ployer representative to the pool Board of Governors).
237. Id. at 702.
238. Id. at 740 (testimony of Lew Hayden, employer board representative and co-
founder of San Antonio Shoe).
239. 1988 Rate Decision, supra note 221, at 11-12.
240. Id. at 12.
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ple evidence that some residual market servicing carriers
have failed to meet their legal and contractual obliga-
tions" . . . creating a "systemic problem" of "pervasively in-
flated" costs.2 4 1  The superintendent estimated that poor
claims handling inflated residual market costs by 30 percent,
and imposed a 1.5 percent rate penalty to account for these
excessive costs.2 4 2 That rate penalty had little immediate im-
pact on insurers, however, because virtually all premium re-
mained in the residual market so that at least half of the
burden of this rate reduction fell on employers (as pool rein-
surers).
Again in the 1992 rate hearing, the superintendent found
substantial evidence of "widespread servicing deficiencies" in
the residual market, resulting in losses provisionally esti-
mated at 2.5 percent of overall premium costs ($21 million)
along with "inadequate investment practices" by the NCCI re-
sulting in a $19 million loss to the pool.2 " The NCCI's limited
internal audits found pervasive servicing performance at lev-
els the it rated "marginal" or "unacceptable."2  The superin-
tendent explained the moral hazard problem: 'With the pro-
tection provided by the potential for fresh start [employer]
surcharges, the insurance companies have caused, to a sig-
nificant degree, the very deficits for which they now seek in-
demnification."2 4 5 These practices included failing to collect
premiums, failing to maintain accurate loss records and other
claims-related data, failure to provide safety or other loss
control services, failing to hire or support adequate servicing
staff, failure to manage claims adequately, and failing to
adopt or follow a reasonable pool investment policy. 246 Em-
ployers presented evidence of particularly incompetent and
deficient servicing by the one insurer with complete immunity
from pool liability.
Not surprisingly, the residual market began to accumu-
late a potentially large deficit. Beginning with policies written
in 1989, insurers risked sharing responsibility for any deficits
241. 1990 Rate Decision, supra note 224, at 7.
242. Id.
243. 1992 Rate Decision, supra note 227, at 2.
244. Id. at 18.
245. Id. at 19.
246. Id. at 19.
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if they failed to make "good faith" efforts to repopulate the
voluntary market. But that risk of liability was not effective
until several years after 1989 because of the time lag in data
about the costs of claims for policies written in that year
(since many benefit payments for 1989 injuries would not be
completed for several years at least).247 In 1991, the Insur-
ance Superintendent found that NCCI witnesses "appear to
concede" that insurers were liable for half of the post-1988
deficits because they had failed to satisfy requirements for
repopulating the pool, but the superintendent did not charge
insurers yet because of insufficient data on amount of the
deficit for 1989.248 That decision, however, made clear that
insurers would soon face the danger of assessments for any
deficits. In 1992, as the threat of deficit liability became real,
insurers again filed plans to withdraw from the entire market.
In the rate suppression story, these impending insurer
deficit assessments for possibly enormous deficits were the
final death blow dealt to Maine's private insurers by a state
bent on denying them fair rates.24 9 If insurers could have
profitably underwritten voluntary market policies after the
1987 reforms, why would they have stayed in the obviously
cost-inflating residual market at the risk of exposure to deficit
liability after 1988? A closer look shows two reasons.
First, when insurers' 1988 window of unconditional im-
munity from residual market deficits closed, insurers once
again faced the risk of deficit assessments - his time en-
hanced by even greater incentives for poor servicing and
management - recreating the collective action problem that
deterred individual insurers from pursuing voluntary market
profits. Without this problem, even if rates still remained
somewhat inadequate overall, the substantial rate increases
and benefit cuts during the 1987-1992 period would have
made at least a portion of the market profitable for at least
some insurers (and indeed, as discussed below, it did for a
247. See ME. REV. STAT. Ann. tit.24-A, § 2367(C) (insurers may be assessed begin-
ning in 1991 for failure to increase voluntary market writings); 1991 Rate Decision,
supra note 226, at 16 (stating that although insurers failed to make good faith efforts
to depopulate the pool in 1989, the data for that year was not yet sufficiently devel-
oped to determine whether a deficit exists).
248. 1991 Rate Decision, supra note 226, at 16.
249. See Kerr, supra note 1.
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different group of insurers). Instead, the traditional insurers'
residual market share remained virtually unchanged or even
grew during this time. In Maine's 1992 ratesetting proceed-
ing, NCCI witness and economist John Worrall acknowledged
that in order for insurers to return to the voluntary market,
rates would have to be high enough not only to profitably
cover voluntary market risks, but also to cover any individual
insurers' risk of disproportionate residual market assess-
ments - an extra charge that Worrall agreed "might have to
be very high."2 50 Insurers' failure to avoid this problem by
taking advantage of the 1988 immunity period could have
been due to a number of factors other than rate inadequacy,
such as insurers' managerial sluggishness, unwillingness to
take any significant risk in the face of changing benefit condi-
tions, preference for short-term servicing profits, strategic
boycotting to obtain further benefit cuts or rate hikes, or poor
information from the NCCI about projected costs.
Second, the insurers remaining in Maine's market after
1987 to take advantage of residual market servicing opportu-
nities appear to have calculated that they could once again
resist the state's conditions on the protection against risk af-
forded by the residual market and the new Fresh Start im-
munity. The (temporary) opportunity for high gains from low-
risk servicing profits, and insurers' political and economic
power to prevent the state from enforcing the deficit-sharing
provision, could have induced some insurers to continue to
focus their business in the residual market. Indeed, some in-
surers who benefited from the residual market servicing op-
portunities succeeded to a large extent in shifting their post-
1989 residual market liability to others.
In 1992, insurers confronted the impending threat of the
first assessment for the 1989 residual market deficit. Shortly
after the 1987 residual market plan was established, the Bu-
reau of Insurance had issued regulations specifying that 90
percent of insurers' portion of the deficit would be the re-
sponsibility of servicing carriers on an "equal share basis,"
while the other 10 percent would be assessed on insurers not
250. Public Advocate Brief, Workers' Compensation 1992 Rate Filing, Me. Bureau
of Ins. Docket No. INS-91-66, Apr. 10, 1992 [hereinafter 1992 Public Advocate Brief],
at 47-48 (quoting cross examination from Tr. pp. 279-80).
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acting as servicing carriers but licensed to write workers'
compensation, again on an "equal share basis."2 51 In addi-
tion, an individual insurer could receive a reduced assess-
ment share based on the degree to which the insurer had in-
creased its voluntary market writings over the 1983-1986
base period.252 To keep their deficit liability small, most in-
surers with only a small portion of the market, either residual
or voluntary, took steps to terminate their Maine business at
the end of 1991, leaving them with only a minimal share of
the 1989-1991 deficits.
Although the major servicing carriers who faced the bulk
of the liability also filed plans to withdraw from the state by
the end of 1991,253 four of these insurers agreed to stay after
negotiating with the Bureau of Insurance for an emergency
rule change that would protect them from the impending
deficit assessment.254 This new rule protected servicing carri-
ers by shifting the majority of the deficit burden to insurers
not involved in the residual market255 - many of whom were
not doing any workers' compensation business in the state
but simply held a state license.2 5 6 Although those other in-
surers of course then took steps to withdraw from the mar-
ket, the timing of the rule change nonetheless forced these
carriers to unwittingly assume the bulk of liability for any
1992 deficits.2 5 7 Later in 1992, a state court ruled that this
emergency rule change was unconstitutional.258
Even without judicial intervention, however, this rule
change was only a stop-gap attempt to hold together a market
251. Bureau of Insurance Rule 440, § 15(C) (Me. 1989) (later amended, repealed
Nov. 5, 1995).
252. Id. at § 15(C)(4).
253. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins., No. CV-92-83, 1992 WL
898675, at *4 (Me. Super. Dec. 10, 1992).
254. Id. See Notice of Emergency Rulemaking, Nov. 26, 1991, Proposed Rule Ch.
640, Workers' Compensation Ins. Residual Market Deficits.
255. See State Farm, 1992 WL 898675 at *5 (finding that, with a deficit of $50 mil-
lion, "major carriers"-including most servicing carriers - would bear only 28% of the
deficit leaving other carriers with 72% of the deficit cost).
256. Id. at *5-6; see Notice of Emergency Rulemaking, Acting Superintendent of
Insurance Richard E. Johnson, Nov. 26, 1991, Proposed Rule Ch. 640, Workers'
Compensation Insurance Residual Market Deficits 4(A) ("major carriers" would be
required to assume only 60% of the deficit, subject to a maximum assessment per
carrier).
257. See State Fam, 1992 WL 898675 at *6.
258. Id.
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on the course toward complete collapse at the end of 1992,
when the non-participating insurers could withdraw to es-
cape liability. This impending withdrawal, once again, re-
quired dramatic legislative intervention. But, contrary to the
New York Times' and other commentators' account of the cri-
sis, insurers' withdrawal had little to do with the relationship
between voluntary market costs compared to rates. Instead,
in 1992, insurers' withdrew specifically from the residual
market, or (for those not involved in the residual market) from
residual market liability. What changed suddenly for the
worse in 1992 was not voluntary market profitability but the
beginning of insurers' residual market deficit liability.
Rather than being an example of insurer victimization
through regulator (and employer) moral hazard, these deficit
assessments were an attempt to internalize the costs insurers
had implicitly agreed to bear as the costs of doing business in
a predominantly residual market under their control and in-
sulated from competition or underwriting risk. In the 1992
rate proceeding, the superintendent ordered direct insurer
assessments not only to enforce the "Fresh Start" law's pen-
alty for failure to make "good faith" efforts to depopulate the
pool, but also to compensate employers for the portion of the
pool deficits that the superintendent attributed to insurers'
extensive pool mismanagement.'
No longer able to shift the risk to other non-participating
insurers, the servicing carriers reverted to their familiar
strategy of challenging this regulatory decision in state
court.260 The NCCI refused to comply with the superinten-
dent's order for administering the pool assessments.2 6 1 Late
in 1994, a lower court upheld the assessment for lack of
"good faith," but ruled that the superintendent lacked statu-
tory authority to consider the effect of insurer mismanage-
ment in calculating the deficit (although the superintendent
could consider mismanagement in determining insurers' rate
of return).26 2
Finally, in 1995, as that case was being appealed, insur-
259. 1992 Rate Decision, supra note 227, at 21, 22.
260. See National Council on Compensation Ins. v. Superintendent of Ins., No.




ers turned to the state legislature for protection against the
risk of an unfavorable court ruling. Together with business
representatives, several insurers negotiated a settlement in
which the insurers agreed to withdraw their litigation in ex-
change for state legislation that would bail out the residual
market deficit.263 The state enacted this bailout law, which
divided the deficit for 1989-1992, estimated at $220 million,
between insurers and employers.264 The residual market pool
had terminated its prospective insurance functions at the end
of 1992, and at this point existed only to continue paying out
ongoing obligations under old policies. The deal required in-
surers to pay $65 million at the beginning of 1996, with the
majority of this assessment coming from carriers with major
responsibilities for servicing the pool. The law charged an
additional $45 million from the state's guaranty fund for in-
solvent insurers (an amount designed to "refund" residual
market pool's payments to the guaranty fund from 1988-
1992).265 Employers were responsible for $110 million, to be
paid through surcharges over ten years. Although a national
insurance publication portrayed the bailout law as a "money
grabbing scheme" by the state against insurers,"' it essen-
tially allowed major servicing carriers to escape with less than
a third of the estimated deficit - even though the Fresh Start
statute had imposed a penalty of half the deficits from 1989-
1992, and even though the superintendent had imposed ad-
ditional penalties for mismanagement and excessive fees.
263. See GOVERNOR'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION ADVISORY COMM., FRESH START
SETTLEMENT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 3, 4 (Maine Council of Self-Insurers, June
1995).
264. An Act to Create the Workers' Compensation Residual Market Deficit Resolu-
tion and Recovery Act, P.L. 1995 Ch. 289 L.D. 1578, codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24-A, §§ 2391-96 (West 2000).
265. The state treated this amount as improperly paid by the pool during those
years because the pool's solvency was guaranteed by employers through surcharges.
266. Maine's Money Grab Must be Stopped, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July 10, 1995, at
22 (editorial).
267. The bailout law was challenged in court by several insurers who had little or
no participation in the Maine market during the deficit period. To settle this litiga-
tion, in 1998 the pool and insurers with major responsibility for pool servicing
agreed to refund $8.5 million of the insurers' assessments to these non-participating
insurers. See Meg Fletcher, Maine Regulators, Insurers Reach Comp Settlement, BUS.
INS., Oct. 19, 1998, at 27.
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D. Competition from Self-Insurance
The 1980s- 1990s crisis period was a time not only of
large residual markets in Maine and elsewhere, but also of
strong growth in a type of "voluntary" insurance supply. In
fact, Maine's residual market was actually shrinking rapidly
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, even though the tradi-
tional voluntary commercial insurance market remained near
or below a minuscule 10 percent level from the 1987 reforms
until that state's market collapsed in 1992. The rate sup-
pression picture leaves out or misrepresents the dramatic
growth of self-insurance during the crisis period, in Maine
and in many other states.
Most states permit employers to self-insure if they satisfy
strict regulatory requirements designed to ensure financial
capacity to cover future benefit costs."' That option tradi-
tionally was exercised mainly by large employers who could
better manage the high transaction costs and steep capital
requirements imposed by states to ensure self-insurers' long-
term capacity to pay benefits. When rates increased and ser-
vicing quality declined during the crisis period, more busi-
nesses sought opportunities for saving money through self-
insurance,26 9 even though during that period most states
tightened regulatory monitoring and financial requirements
for self-insurance.2 7 0 In Maine and other states, regulators
responded to employers' demand for more opportunities for
self-insurance by authorizing group programs through which
small businesses could pool capital, liability and administra-
tive costs.271 From 1991 to 1993, self-insurers' nationwide
share of the market increased by 4.2 percent.2 7 2 In Maine in
particular, while the commercial insurance market floun-
dered, the group self-insurance market flourished despite ex-
tensive regulation, high organizational costs and lengthy
268. See Burton, DESK BOOK, supra note 14, at 1-39.
269. National figures show a growth in self-insurance from less than 14.8% in
1970 to 25% in 1998. THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13, at 33 fig. 2.10. However, in-
dividual state growth and self-insurance share varies widely. See Burton, DESK
BOOK, supra note 14, at 1-39.
270. See Burton, DESK BOOK, supra note 14, at 1-41.
271. Many states changed regulatory requirements during the 1980s to permit
group self-insurance. Id at 1-40.
272. See Burton, 1996 YEAR BOOK, supra note 25, at 1-3.
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start-up processes.
In Maine's 1992 rate proceeding, the director of the
Maine Council of Self-Insurers questioned insurers' claims of
rate inadequacy by describing how, after the 1987 reforms,
Maine's residual market pool emptied out into self-insurance
rather than into voluntary market commercial insurance. He
reported that in 1989, self-insurance accounted for 29 per-
cent of the total premium written in the Maine market, grow-
ing to 35 percent in 1990 and 40 percent in 1991, and was
continuing to grow rapidly."' These new self-insured busi-
nesses faced the same benefit system as commercial insurers
and comparable or higher insurance "prices." State regula-
tions required self-insured groups to set aside "premiums"
based on the level of existing NCCI rates in addition to other
capital requirements.
With comparable or higher costs, why did so many busi-
nesses in Maine (and in other states) rush to take on the un-
derwriting risk that commercial insurers refused to assume?
In Maine, no evidence seems to have surfaced of widespread
inadequate financing by naive or opportunistic businesses
under lax solvency regulation, although this may have oc-
curred in some states to some extent. Instead, by 1992,
when the Maine residual market was showing enormous defi-
cits for the post-1988 period, self-insurance pools operating
with similar "premium" charges for the same period were
showing ample surpluses.27 4 In place of the high deficit as-
sessments facing residual market employers and insurers,
these self-insured groups were planning to return "dividends"
to their employer members because of excessive "rates."2 7 5
If insurance rates were being suppressed uring this time
of large residual markets, one would expect the opposite re-
sult: that self-insured employers would turn to commercial
insurance to take advantage of insurer subsidies.2 7 6 Advo-
cates of the rate suppression theory implicitly acknowledge
that this flight to self-insurance shows inflated commercial
273. See 1992 Public Advocate Brief, supra note 250, at 5 (quoting testimony of
John Melrose, transcript pp. 355-56).
274. Id. at 6.
275. Id.
276. See DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 76 (explaining that "lower prices
compared with costs should encourage firms to buy commercial insurance").
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market rates, but they attribute that rate inflation to rate
suppression in other parts of the market.2 77 That is, they ex-
plain that self-insured employers can profitably assume un-
derwriting risk because of cross-subsidies: commercial insur-
ance companies charged these (now) self-insured employers
excessive rates to offset inadequate rates for other, costlier
employers. This could happen if insurers' risk classifications
imperfectly reflected costs, so that within a particular class
rates were ample to cover some employers' insurance costs,
even though average rates fell short of expected costs. Some
expert accounts of rate suppression portray the exodus to
self-insurance by low-risk employers as adverse selection that
victimized insurers by leaving them with higher cost risks
that further depressed their profits.2 78
But if allegedly suppressed rates nonetheless allowed se-
lective opportunities for profit, why did commercial insurers
surrender those opportunities? In the 1980s, many states
began to allow insurers to deviate from regulated rates by of-
fering discounts, dividends, and risk-sharing arrangements to
desirable employers,2 79 which should have increased opportu-
nities for price competition between commercial insurance
and self-insurance. The rise in self-insurance during the
1980s and early 1990s therefore suggests more that commer-
cial insurers failed to pursue available profits, and that lower-
risk employers refused to subsidize insurers by paying for
overpriced coverage - rather than that insurers were forced to
subsidize employers.
Proponents of the rate suppression theory tend to put
more weight on a second cross-subsidy theory that instead
explains self-insurance growth as voluntary market employ-
ers' refusal to subsidize residual market deficits. In this the-
ory, when rate suppression led to large deficit-producing re-
sidual markets, insurers recovered those residual market
deficits by "taxing" voluntary market employers through in-
flated voluntary market rates.2 8 0 Voluntary market employers
277. See id. at 43.
278. See id. at 42-43 (discussing George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987)); KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 1, at
52.
279. THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13, at 39-40.
280. KRAMER, supra note 9, at 80.
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then turned to self-insurance to avoid subsidizing the higher-
cost residual market, again leaving insurers to bear the high
residual market losses.2 8 ' Kramer explains, "In short, the lar-
ger the underpriced residual market, the more costs shift to
the voluntary market, which in turn reduces the attractive-
ness of the voluntary market for insureds."2 82
This explanation acknowledges that voluntary market
rates were excessive, not inadequate, compared to voluntary
market costs, and instead makes the problem of rate sup-
pression mainly an issue of residual market rates. But dur-
ing the crisis period, states typically used the same risk clas-
sifications and the same system of experience rating for indi-
vidual firms in both markets, and often charged the same or
higher rates per classification for residual market coverage
compared to voluntary market coverage.2 8 3 That means rate
inadequacy in the residual market but not the voluntary
market could come from two problems: first, the residual
market could have the most costly employers within each risk
classification; or second, the residual market could have the
most costly insurance practices because of a structure de-
signed to encourage insurer moral hazard.
This first explanation does not explain the large residual
markets of the 1980s and early 1990s. When residual mar-
kets grew to substantial or majority portions of the market
during that crisis period, they were no longer composed of
only the riskiest employers within each category; insurers
themselves explained this growth as a problem of overall rate
inadequacy, not imperfect risk classifications that made risk-
ier employers difficult to insure profitably.2 84 But if increased
self-insurance shows that the problem was not overall rate
inadequacy, but cross-subsidies that inflated voluntary mar-
281. DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 111; KRAMER, supra note 9, at 80.
282. KRAMER, supra note 9, at 80.
283. See id. at 84. As residual market deficits grew in the 1980s, many states im-
posed higher rate charges for residual market policies than for voluntary market
policies. See NCCI MANAGEMENT SUMMARY 1990: THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
REINSURANCE POOLS 2.
284. See DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 15; THOMASON ET AL., supra note
13, at 44 (explaining the dominant factor in residual market growth during the
1980s was not risky employers, but general rate inadequacy); THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION REINSURANCE POOLS, supra note 283, at 2 (stating that rate inadequacy
caused residual markets to deviate from their traditional role as market of last resort
for high-risk employers).
2001] 117
118 EMPLOYEE RJGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 5:55
ket rates, then those cross-subsidies probably came from
costlier residual market insurance practices rather than from
costlier residual market employers.
In short, the growth of self-insurance during the crisis
period shows not that rate controls forced insurers to cover
unprofitable risks, but that insurers lost profitable business
because they tried to make employers bear the costs of insur-
ers' residual market risk-spreading. However, the rate sup-
pression story is not inconsistent when it complains both of
overall rate inadequacy (causing growing residual markets)
and of inflated rates (causing growing self-insurance) if it
means that "rate adequacy" requires rates high enough to
cover not just prospective voluntary market underwriting
costs but also insurers' past residual market deficits. The
standard approach to regulated ratesetting, however, was
based on the theory that rates should be sufficient to cover
projected costs. Rate regulation traditionally has presumed
that private insurers are paid to assume the risk that pro-
spective rates will fall short of projected costs; if they lose
money, their remedy is to seek prospective rate increases (or
to exit the market), not to get repaid for lost profits from ret-
rospectively inadequate rates - otherwise, they would not be
assuming any insurance risk. Maine's 1987 "Fresh Start"
provision that (temporarily) guaranteed compensation for
past shortfalls was an unusual exception to this standard
rule.
If, outside of Maine's "Fresh Start" system, insurers were
trying to use prospective voluntary market rate inflation to
cover past residual market deficits, then they generally would
have had to do so by disguising these residual market
charges as prospective voluntary market cost estimates.
Regulators may have been controlling for this surreptitious
cost-shifting when they granted rates below insurers' re-
quests. In many states, insurers appear to have attempted to
recover residual market losses by adding covert, unauthor-
ized surcharges to policies for voluntary market employers.2 8 5
A number of class action lawsuits filed in the late 1990s al-
285. Most states prohibited voluntary market rates from including charges for re-
sidual market deficits. See Michael Bradford, Hartford Offers to Settle, Bus. INS.,
Jan. 18, 1999, at 2 (quoting attorney John Karaczynski).
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leged that this practice of insurer fraud cost employers as
much as $1 billion. 28 6 The growth of self-insurance may have
served to partly reduce these opportunities for insurer moral
hazard.
The example of Maine's self-insurance boom shows how
excessive rather than inadequate residual market charges
drove employers to reject commercial insurance."' Contrary
to the cross-subsidy theory, in Maine the mass exodus to
self-insurance came from the residual, rather than the volun-
tary market. High-risk manufacturing industries rather than
lower-risk financial services industries dominated Maine's
self-insurance market, suggesting that industries with the
highest costs found the greatest opportunities for savings.28 8
Contrary to the adverse selection theory, self-insurance
tended to attract employers with a range of individual risk
ratings within each classification, not just the lowest-risk
businesses. The Maine self-insurance market showed an av-
erage individual experience rating of 1.22 in 1990, on a scale
where more than 1 represents an above-average cost history
within an industry classification.2 8 9
Many Maine employers were able to save money by self-
insuring during that state's crisis period not just because
commercial insurers overestimated employers' underwriting
costs, but also because commercial insurers (especially in the
residual market) increased employers' underwriting costs.
For example, one large manufacturing company that left the
residual market for self-insurance in 1990 had an individual
286. See id. (reporting on class actions pending in Alabama, Pennsylvania, Cali-
fornia, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, New Jersey, New York, Michigan, Georgia
and Illinois). The Hartford Insurance Company offered to settle the claims it faced
for $12.6 million. Id. See also Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indem-
nity Ins. Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 867 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment in RICO-based class action suit claiming insurers fraudulently
charged voluntary market employers for residual market deficit assessments).
287. In short insurers lost money not because of inadequate rates but "as a result
of bad management." 1992 Rate Hearing, supra note 201, at 364 (testimony of John
Melrose). He noted that the substantial impediments, id. at 356-57, and additional
costs of self-insurance are outweighed in employers' minds "because of what they
view as excessive charging in the residual market." Id. at 357.
288. 1992 Public Advocate Brief. supra note 250, at 7-8 (quoting Melrose testi-
mony, transcript p. 358).
289. 1992 Rate Hearing, supra note 201, at 368 (testimony of John Melrose). In
Maine, self-insurance tended to saturate the market of particular industries rather
than to involve only the best risks. Id. at 358. Ninety percent of automobile dealers
were self-insured - not best risks but majority of market. Id.
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risk experience rating of 2.47. compared to an average risk of
1 for the same industry classification.2 9 0 An executive from
the company testified in Maine's 1992 ratesetting hearing
that in the residual market they received no loss control ser-
vices, and indeed were unable to obtain accurate records of
claims paid from their servicing insurer so that they could at-
tempt to control losses on their own.29 ' The company was
able to profitably self-insure because of "excellent loss control
services" (at less than half the cost of residual market servic-
ing fees) from an independent servicing contractor that
helped them achieve a "drastic decrease in lost-time acci-
dents."29 2 Similarly, the manager of a group self-insurance
program for public schools testified that, despite including
many employers with above-average risks when the pool be-
gan in 1990, the group's insurance fund had enough money
to pay dividends to members in the near future.29 3 "We won-
der why [the NCCI's residual market pool shows a deficit], if
we can use the same basic rates they are charging, provide
what we think is superior service to their previous carriers,
and yet we still develop a surplus."2 94
The director of the Maine Council of Self-Insurers ex-
plained that better management allowed self-insureds to
dramatically reduce employers' claims costs, administrative
295 . 296aietheadexpenses,29 and litigation expenses. He explained three ad
vantages of self-insurance lacking in the residual market: an
emphasis on safety and loss control, better medical manage-
ment and medical cost containment, and an emphasis on re-
turning injured workers to work promptly.2 9 7 In Maine and in
many other states during the crisis period, "third party ad-
ministrators," who contracted with self-insurers to manage
290. 1992 Public Advocate Brief, supra note 250, at 7 (quoting testimony of Ben
Dever, executive of Guilford of Maine, transcript at 320). However, this company's
managers believed some of its high rating was due to inaccurate loss records by the
servicing carrier. 1992 Rate Hearing, supra note 201, at 320 (testimony of Ben
Dever).
291. 1992 Rate Hearing, supra note 201, at 311-12 (testimony of Ben Dever).
292. Id. at 312.
293. Id. at 386 (testimony of Ted Jellison for the Maine School Management
Ass'n).
294. Id. at 399.
295. Id. at 357 (testimony of John Melrose).
296. Id- at 358.
297. Id. at 365.
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their workers' compensation claims, enjoyed a booming busi-
ness by marketing innovative loss control services to high-
cost businesses frustrated with high insurance rates. As a
result, during the period in which the NCCI-run residual
market in Maine projected astronomical deficits,298 the overall
record of self-insurers showed adequate or even excessive
rates for comparable or even costlier businesses.2 9 9
Finally, employers' rejection of commercial insurance for
self-insurance was not a temporary phenomenon, further re-
futing the theory that this self-insurance trend was a problem
of employers taking advantage of cross-subsidies produced by
rate suppression during the crisis period. An insurance in-
dustry report estimated the "alternative" market (comprised of
traditional self-insurance, group self-insurance, and commer-
cial policies with large deductibles) at 40 percent of the mar-
ket in early 2001300 compared to 36 percent at the start of
1996.301
E. Competition from State Funds
Those who questioned the rising insurance costs of the
1980s as a problem of excessive charges by insurers some-
times proposed replacing private markets with state insur-
ance funds. Indeed, as a critical part of the 1990s reforms, a
number of states established state funds to compete with pri-
vate insurers and to provide an alternative to insurer-
managed residual markets. In 1984, Minnesota established
the first new state fund for workers' compensation since
1933.302 Between 1991 and 1997, amidst a political climate
favoring privatization, eight more states added competitive
state funds.o3 Government insurance funds as a whole (in-
cluding the six longstanding exclusive state funds, competi-
298. See supra text accompany note 209.
299. 1992 Rate Hearing, supra note 201, at 361, 369 (testimony of John Melrose).
300. Ruth Gastel, Residual Markets, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Jan. 2001.
301. Ruth Gastel, Workers' Compensation, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Jan.
1996. Using a different definition of self-insurance and including government funds
in the total market share, the self-insured portion of the market grew from 19.7% in
1990 to 25% in 1998. THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13 , at 33 fig. 2.10.
302. THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13, at 34.
303. See id. at 304 tbl. A.8. However, in 1994, Michigan privatized its state fund.
Id. at 35.
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tive funds and federal funds) increased their share of the na-
tional market by 3.5 percent between 1991 and 1993.304
Following the rate suppression theory, insurers and oth-
ers argued that new state funds would exacerbate rather than
solve the crisis by transferring liability for rate shortfalls to
taxpayers in general and by encouraging additional politi-
cally-motivated cost-shifting that would eventually lead to fi-
nancial disaster.3 0 5  Furthermore, critics argued that state
funds would fall short of private insurers in management
skills, insurance expertise, and in safety and loss prevention
services.30 6
Although some longstanding state funds during the
1980s did face deficits and management problems, 307 just like
private insurers, some of the new state funds that replaced
insurer-run residual markets appear to have thrived where
private insurers failed. As insurers of last resort, these new
state funds have successfully assumed the residual market
risk that private insurers had abandoned or driven to high
deficits. Contrary to the conventional industry view, these
state funds have not shown a continuing effort to avoid the
costs of the system through political protection of employers
- more regulatory moral hazard. Instead, at least some state
funds have successfully controlled workers' compensation in-
surance costs for employers (though perhaps not for work-
ers), without operating at a deficit, by better controlling costs.
In Maine, for example, when insurers made plans to leave
the state with a large residual market deficit in 1992, state
lawmakers finally responded to this last insurer withdrawal
304. Id. at 1-2.
305. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 1, at 53-54. See also Roger K. Kenney,
Workers' Compensation State Funds: Disappearing Capital (undated publication by
the Alliance of American Insurers, based on data through 1991) (warning of insol-
vency dangers in state funds); William P. White, Maine WC: What a Long, Difficult Trip
It's Been, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, April 19, 1993, at 10 (reporting skepticism that
MEMIC would stick to business, not politics); Landmark Legal Foundation, Missouri
Insurance Scheme Challenged; Pending 'Disaster' for Employers. Taxpayers, PR
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 2, 1995 (describing Missouri's new state fund as a "savings and
loan-type disaster waiting to happen," and predicting it would fail, leaving employers,
taxpayers, and private insurers "holding the bag").
306. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 1, at 54.
307. See, e.g., Emily A. Spieler, Injured Workers, Workers' Compensation, and
Work: New Perspectives on the Workers' Compensation Debate in West Virginia, 95 W.
VA. L. REv. 333, 456 (1992-93) (discussing deficit in West Virginia's exclusive state
fund).
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threat by reducing insurers' control over the market. With
previous reforms, the state unsuccessfully tried numerous
ways of regulating the risk of insurer moral hazard while ac-
commodating insurers' demands for lower costs. In 1992, by
replacing the insurer-run residual market with a new semi-
independent state fund, the state was able to turn around
Maine's insurance market. This new fund, called the Maine
Employers' Mutual Insurance Company (MEMIC), inherited
the policies from the infamous residual market pool - which
at the time was virtually the entire market - and, as the in-
surer of last resort, was charged with covering all employers
undesired by private insurers.
Maine's second major insurance reform in 1992 was to
open up insurance rates to price competition by eliminating
requirements for prior approval of rates. These reforms limit
the NCCI to filing NCCI advisory data on loss costs only (leav-
ing out expense, profit and investment data), and require in-
dividual insurers to seek rate changes by filing their own final
rates subject to minimal review by regulators.
In the conventional wisdom, Maine's dramatic turn-
around in the 1990s resulted from its comprehensive and
tough 1992 benefit-cutting legislation that finally reduced
costs sufficiently to make the insurance system both sustain-
able and affordable.30 Sorting out the effects of the benefit
reforms from insurance reforms is difficult, and beyond the
scope of this paper. Nonetheless, if rate suppression had
been the primary problem in Maine's private commercial in-
surance market in the 1980s and early 1990s, then those
private commercial insurers should have taken back the
market after the 1992 reforms cut benefits, lifted rate con-
trols, and eliminated prospective residual market liability
(and after the subsequent bailout and settlement of retro-
spective residual market deficits).
Instead, these reforms left Maine with a strikingly differ-
ent insurance market structure in which private commercial
insurers have a far more limited role than they did at the
start of the 1980s crisis. Although by the late 1990s, private
308. See, e.g., Meg Fletcher, Maine Leads Comp Rate Turnaround- Voluntary Mar-
kets' Successful Reforms Benefit Employers, Bus. INS., Jan. 9, 1995, at 3 (reporting
NCCI's request for a 12.5% drop in loss costs).
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insurers had picked up a significant portion of the Maine
market,o9 MEMIC remains highly competitive, with a hefty 45
percent of the market in 2000 (not including self-insurance),
down from a peak of 67 percent in 1995.310 Self-insurance
programs also have retained a large portion of the market
ceded by private insurers: in Maine in 2000, 45 percent of the
state's premium was self-insured, down from a peak of 52
percent in 1995.3"
The alternative story of Maine's insurance crisis as a
problem of insurer moral hazard better explains this insur-
ance market restructuring. Like the expanded self-insurance
market - and unlike the traditional regulated insurance mar-
ket, and especially the NCCI-managed residual market - the
new state fund is structured on the model of group self-
insurance to encourage workers' compensation insurance
gains to come from reducing employers' costs rather than
from spreading costs to employers. The law establishing
MEMIC aimed to make the fund primarily accountable to its
insured employers, for example, by requiring that its nine
member board of directors consist of at least six MEMIC poli-
cyholders along with two public members appointed by the
Governor, none of whom can be workers' compensation "ser-
vice providers" or lobbyists.3 12 Furthermore, the law estab-
lishes advisory boards for each of several subdivisions of the
company, based geographically or by industry, with members
elected from both policyholders and workers in that subdivi-
sion."' These advisory boards have power to review MEMIC
performance in premium collection, safety services, and
claims administration (among other things), and to bring
policyholder grievances to the central Board.3 1' Like a self-
insurance plan, MEMIC is self-funded through initial em-
ployer capital contributions and ongoing premiums and is in-
309. MAINE DEPT. OF PROF. & FINANCIAL REGULATION, THE STATE OF COMPETITION IN
THE MAINE WORKERS' COMPENSATION MARKET 10 (Nov. 1, 2000).
310. Id. at 9, 10.
311. Id. at 17.
312. ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 3703(5) (West 2000). Rhode Island incorporated a
similar requirement into a new state fund replacing its insurer-controlled residual
market. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7.2-3 (Michie 1994).
313. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 3212-A (4) (West 2000).
314. Id.
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sulated from the state's general fund.3 "
In contrast to the previous insurance system, MEMIC
and several of the new competitive state funds in other states
have focused on loss prevention and intensive claims man-
agement (rather than legislative intervention or risk selection)
as a central strategy for covering costs.3 16  MEMIC's self-
promotional materials stress its competitive advantages in
loss control over other insurers. Its opening web page state-
ment reads:
Looking for a workers' comp company that answers to Main
Street, not Wall Street?... you can count on MEMIC to
help you improve workplace safety and to provide quality,
compassionate care, as well as timely benefits, when an in-
jury does occur. It's simple, its innovative and it works.
It's the MEMIC Way.
Beyond this rhetoric, MEMIC offers a detailed safety-
promotion web site with tools for employers to improve their
loss prevention.
The President and Chief Executive Officer of MEMIC,
John Leonard, explains MEMIC's success: '"When MEMIC was
established, the Maine employers' injury rates and workers
comp premiums were double the national average.... But a
series of industry-specific loss control programs greatly re-
duced the frequency and severity of injuries."319 Leonard dis-
tinguished his company from commercial insurers by noting
its safety education and training programs: MEMIC runs
thousands of safety advertisements, hundreds of training
seminars, and thousands of on-site visits for safety train-
ing.320 For example, MEMIC developed a loss control program
specifically for Maine's high-risk logging industry that in-
cluded a five-day training program for workers.1' In another
315. Id. § 3705.
316. See White, supra note 305, at 10 (describing MEMIC's focus on loss control,
safety and high standards of claims adjustment).
317. Available at <http://www.memic.com/memicsplash.html> (last visit June 3,
2001).
318. Available at <http://www.memicsafetyservices.com> (last visited June 3,
2001).
319. Meg Fletcher, New Programs Must Have Support of Key People, Bus. INs., Oct.
30, 2000, at 20 (quoting John Leonard, President and CEO of MEMIC).
320. Press Release, Maine Employers' Mutual Observes Fifth Anniversary at Em-
ployee Appreciation Lunch, available at <www.memic.com/News/press2-press.html>
(last visited Apr. 15, 2001).
321. Id. See also Beurmond Banville, Work-related Injuries Costly for Town,
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example of the company's innovative hands-on approach to
safety, it mailed bags of ice-melting pellets to 2,000 of its
policyholders with information on reducing winter slip-and-
fall injuries.3 2 2 In 1998, company executives reported that
"MEMIC has led the charge for workplace safety since we be-
gan five years ago and today the results are self-evident.
Thirty percent fewer people are losing time from work."3 2 3
Despite its role as insurer of last resort, MEMIC also has
been able to successfully compete with private commercial
insurers in holding down costs for employers.3 2 4 In the first
five years of its operation, from 1993-1998, MEMIC reduced
rates by 55 percent, while building up capital reserves faster
than anticipated.32 5 In 1998, MEMIC rates were below the
NCCI's recommended cost levels.32 6 In 1999, MEMIC was able
to repay employers for capital contributions made to start up
the company, after reducing rates for six straight years.
While the NCCI's advisory filing requested a 13.5 percent rate
increase for the year 2000, MEMIC saw no need for "anything
close to that for a rate increase."32 8  Contrary to commercial
insurers' predictions, and contrary to their example in the
previous decade, MEMIC has achieved these reduced rates for
employers without financial instability, political intervention,
or bailouts. MEMIC earned an A (excellent) rating for finan-
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May 11, 2000 (describing how MEMIC responded to a series of
injuries in town ambulance workers by providing a loss control plan of mandatory
employee fitness programs, safety training, equipment reviews, and worker screen-
ing).
322. Press Release, Memic Offers Winter Safety Advice That's Worth Its Salt, avail-
able at <http://www.mermic.com/News/press5_press.html> (last visited Apr. 19,
2001).
323. Press Release, Maine's Largest Workers' Comp Company Celebrates Fifth
Anniversary with Largest-Ever Rate Decrease, (Jan 5, 1998), available at <www.
memic.com/News/pressl-press.html> (last visited Apr. 15, 2001) [hereinafter 1998
MEMIC Press Release].
324. See Peter M. Gore, No Way State Can Mimic MEMIC for Health Insurance,
KENNEBEC (AUGUSTA, ME) J., Feb. 14, 2000, at A5 (stating, from perspective of Maine
State Chamber of Commerce, that MEMIC "has certainly turned out to be a success
story in the area of workers' compensation" but debating proposals for using MEMIC
as a model for health insurance reform.").
325. Press Release, State's Largest Workers' Comp Company Authorized to Provide
Maine Employers Out-of-State Coverage, available at <www.memic.com/News/ gov-
ernor press.html> (last visited Apr. 15, 2001).
326. 1998 MEMIC Press Release, supra note 323.
327. Dean Lunt, Workers' Comp Insurer to Return Funds, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
Sept. 14, 1999, at 1A.
328. Id. (quoting MEMIC President and Chief Executive Officer John Leonard).
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cial strength and performance by A.M. Best, which rarely
gives such high ratings to single-line single-state insurers.3 2 9
In addition, Maine's Workers' Compensation Board rated
MEMIC 46 percent better than competing commercial insur-
ers in complying with state requirements for paying benefits
on time to injured workers.3 3 0
Besides reducing costs for their own policyholders,
MEMIC and other new competitive state funds have the po-
tential to control moral hazard in commercial insurance bet-
ter than did direct rate regulation. Rate controls were ineffec-
tive in the long run in controlling insurer moral hazard be-
cause, first, insurers retained control over critical information
about highly uncertain costs, making excessive rates difficult
to distinguish from suppressed rates. Second, rate controls
were ineffective because insurers could escape those controls
through their power over insurance supply in a market de-
pendent on private insurance.
As the history of workers' compensation regulation sug-
gests, rate regulation is subject to capture by the industry.
With increased price competition and reduced cartel pricing
in the 1990s, Maine and many other states removed some
opportunities for insurer moral hazard by removing price pro-
tections that dampened incentives for insurer cost control.
Even so, the complexity and uncertainty of projecting and
monitoring costs and servicing quality in workers' compensa-
tion in particular provide continuing opportunities for com-
mercial insurers to take less care to reduce insurance costs
than employers would prefer.
By setting a competitive benchmark based on more direct
accountability to workers' compensation policyholders in a
specific state, new competitive state funds exemplify one ver-
sion of an innovative approach to regulation described by Ian
Ayres and John Braithwaite.3 3 1 Ayres and Braithwaite sketch
out a model of "partial-industry intervention" that has poten-
329. Press Release, Memic Earns an 'A' (Excellent) Rating from A. M. Best, avail-
able at <www.memic.com/News/bestratingpress.html> (last visited Apr. 15, 2001).
330. Press Release, State's Largest Workers' Comp Company Authorized to Provide
Maine Employers Out-of-State Coverage, available at <www.memic.com/News/ gov-
emor-press .html> (last visited Apr. 15, 2001).
331. See generally, IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 133-57 (1992).
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tial to avoid some of the problems of regulatory capture.3 3 2
They explain that by entering (or subsidizing) a cartelized or
otherwise imperfect market as a competitive producer, gov-
ernments may improve market performance more than they
can by attempting to directly monitor and control the behav-
ior of incumbent inefficient producers.3 3 3 The new competitive
state funds reflect a situation where a government provider
can overcome some of the high organizational and informa-
tion costs that would have discouraged many employers from
forming self-insurance groups.3 34
In the case of Maine's state fund, it seems likely that
MEMIC's unusual emphasis on safety and other forms of loss
prevention could have served as a competitive benchmark
that ratcheted up the loss control efforts of commercial insur-
ers who previously relied more on risk selection, risk pooling,
and rate increases to respond to uncertain benefit costs. As
an insurer limited (initially) to Maine workers' compensation
and required to serve all employers,3 5 MEMIC might have
been able to gain a competitive advantage over traditional
multiline, multistate or multinational insurance companies
by specializing in controlling the particular risks of Maine's
benefit system, legal and business culture, and industry mix.
Commercial insurers may have adopted some of MEMIC's
successful loss control tactics as they attempted to regain
some of MEMIC's market share in the late 1990s. In addi-
tion, new state funds like MEMIC along with group self-
insurance plans provided a comparative benchmark that con-
tributed to pressure to change the NCCI's residual market
management practices in the states where it retained it's re-
sidual market business. For example, in 1993, the NCCI
opened up residual market servicing to competitive bidding
from insurers, for the first time introducing incentives to con-
332. Id. at 139.
333. Id. at 139-40.
334. See id. at 140 (describing situations where collective action problems may
prevent private firms from similarly subsidizing or creating an alternative supply
source).
335. MEMIC does have the power (with approval of the Insurance Superintendent)
to deny coverage to high-risk employers who refuse to comply with MEMIC's claims
management or safety standards. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 3712-A(3)(B) (West
2000).
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trol fees and performance.33 6
The apparent competitive success of MEMIC and some
other new state funds does not mean that state funds neces-
sarily outperform private insurers. Indeed, Maine's disas-
trous 1987-1992 residual market was essentially a state-
established insurance fund in which the state simply dele-
gated management responsibility with little oversight to the
NCCI and required participating employers and insurers to
share the underwriting risk. A recent empirical analysis by
leading workers' compensation economists showed that
states with competitive state funds had higher costs for em-
ployers between 1975-1995.. The authors of this study note
that they could not control for the possibility that high em-
ployer costs cause states to adopt state funds, rather than
that these funds cause higher costs.338 As the authors sug-
gest, this reverse causation seems particularly likely in the
case of the states (like Maine, Rhode Island, and Louisiana)
that established these funds in the 1990s in the midst of cri-
ses to replace large residual markets.3 39 But the authors also
note that an earlier study of competitive state funds before
the 1990s also showed these had higher costs.34 0
However, these findings are not inconsistent with the
theory that, in states where insurers particularly inflated
costs in the 1980s and early 1990s, new state funds can be
particularly effective in reducing those high costs. This
study's 1995 data would have been too early to reflect
MEMIC's substantial cost reductions, and it is not surprising
that at this time Maine's costs from its years of a badly man-
aged residual market would still have been high compared to
other states.3 4' Although Maine's workers' compensation
336. See NCCI, Residual Market Efforts Begin to Pay Off, in 1995 ISSUES REPORT:
BACK FROM THE BRINK, at 11, 12; Richard L. Katten, Reforms Take Hold in Residual
Market, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, June 19, 1995, at 13 (noting that servicing fees dropped
by as much as 35% while servicing quality improved).
337. THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13, at 152-56, 279.
338. Id. at 155.
339. See id. at 155-56.
340. Id. (citing Alan B. Krueger & John F. Burton, Jr., The Employers' Costs of
Workers' Compensation Insurance: Magnitudes, Determinants, and Public Policy, 72
REv. EcON. & STATS. 228-40 (1990)).
341. Similarly, Rhode Island established its new competitive state fund in the fall
of 1992, and that state's rate decreases began in 1996. See THOMASON ET AL., supra
note 13, at 2-3.
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rates were well above the national average in 1995,342 from
1996-1999 Maine's rates fell by 34.1 percent"3 and by 2000
they were at average levels compared to other states.34 4 Some
of the long-established state funds like New York's have many
of the characteristics of the inefficient residual markets, and
allow for insurer rather than policyholder or worker control.3 4 5
The New York State Insurance Fund, for example, does not
compete with private insurers (at least based on price), but
instead must adopt rates established (with regulatory prior
approval) by the insurer-controlled New York State Compen-
sation Insurance Rating Board.3 4 6
Additional evidence of the success of some of the state
funds comes from private insurers' response to this new
competition. When Missouri established a new state fund in
1995 to cover employers relegated to a large residual market,
private insurers sued to prohibit the state from financing a
company to compete with private carriers.3 4 7 The state fund
won the court battle and went on to become the largest in-
surer in the state, with a hefty surplus and plans for further
expansion in 2000.34 When predicted failures of new state
funds did not materialize by the late 1990s, the American In-
surance Association, an industry advocacy group, launched a
nationwide campaign to impose government restraints on fur-
ther state fund growth.34 9 A 1999 position paper supporting
such action from another coalition of large property-casualty
342. See id. at 66 fig. 3.1, 371 tbl. 3.17 (calculating Maine's 1995 adjusted man-
ual rates at $3.37 per $100 of payroll compared to an average of $2.97).
343. Dean Lunt, Workers' Comp Rates Likely to Rise, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct.
30, 1999, at 1A.
344. See Dean Lunt, Maine Insurer Expanding to N.H. PORTIAND PRESS HERALD,
May 11, 2000, at 8B.
345. See New York State AFL-CIO, RESTORING THE PROMISE: THE REFORM OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK STATE (May 1997) (criticizing New York state
fund's lack of accountability to employers and workers and recommending that it be
governed by a majority of business and labor representatives).
346. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 2339 (McKinney 2001) (forbidding any workers' compen-
sation insurer from deviating from rates established by the rating service).
347. See Landmark Legal Foundation Challenges Government-Financed Insurance
Company, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 29, 1997.
348. Manny Lopez, State-Created Company Thriving Despite Court Challenge, Nay-
sayers, 19 KANSAS CITY BUS. J., Sept. 29, 2000, at 24 (reporting state Dept. of Ins.
spokesperson's conclusion that the new fund "has been everything [Missouri's small
businesses] wanted it to be").
349. See Daniel Hays, Insurers Resist Maine WC Fund Growth Bid, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 4.
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insurers warned of "the rapidly improving financial position of
many of the funds, and the destructive pricing environment
that has followed" because newer state fund managers "have
tended to be very aggressive in the market."050
For the most part, these insurer efforts to politically con-
strain state fund competition have failed. In 2000, Maine's
MEMIC overcame "intense private carrier opposition" to win
regulatory approval for expanding its business into New
Hampshire.3 5 1 In 2001, insurance industry lobbyists failed to
dissuade Utah lawmakers from approving expansion of that
state's fund's business to other states, after the fund success-
fully developed for-profit subsidiaries to provide claims man-
agement for self-insured businesses.3 52 One multistate busi-
ness manager supporting the Utah fund's expansion argued
that businesses had benefitted from increased competition
from state funds and explained that his firm had switched
from a private insurer to the state fund after suspecting the
private insurer of increasing rates in other states to make up
for losses in its California policies.3 In 2000, insurance in-
dustry trade groups convinced Oregon's legislature to form a
task force to study whether Oregon's state fund was engaging
in predatory pricing; private insurers complained that if the
state fund didn't raise its prices they would have to leave the
state.3 5 4 In California, when legislators held a hearing to in-
vestigate insurers' claims of predatory pricing by the state
fund, state regulators reported that despite its growth and
low prices the state fund was in sound financial condition
and had avoided the signs of financial deterioration common
among private insurers in the state.3
350. Id.
351. Daniel Hays, N.H. Regulator Relents on Maine WC Carrier, NAT'L UNDERWRITER,
Feb. 21, 2000, at 2.
352. Roberto Ceniceros, Potential Competitors Cry Foul; Utah Comp Fund Seeks to
Expand, Bus. INS., Jan. 29, 2001, at 2.
353. Id. (quoting Gene Denning, risk manager for Associated Food Stores, Inc.).
354. Oregon State Fund Driving Market Into Turmoil?, 10 WORKERS' COMP.
ExEcuTIvE, May 17, 2000.
355. See State Fund Exonerated of Rumored Financial Problems and Predatory Pric-
ing at Assembly, 11 WORKERS' COMP EXEcuTIvE, April 4, 2001; State Regulators Say
SCIF is Adequately Reserved, 11 CAuF. WORKERS' CoMP ADVISOR, Mar. 28, 2001.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In conventional economic theory, the advantage of a pri-
vate competitive insurance market is that insurers' self-
interest in maximizing profit from financing workers' com-
pensation risk can also promote employers' and workers' in-
terest in reducing the risks of workplace accidents.3 5 6 In the
ideal free-market, insurers gain more the more their premium
exceeds what they have to spend on injury claims - thereby
giving them incentives to control losses. But, as this story of
workers' compensation shows, insurers often have been able
to achieve that gain not by reducing injury costs for employ-
ers and workers, but by shifing more of the risk of work inju-
ries to employers or workers (or both) - the problem of in-
surer moral hazard.
Under traditional rate regulation, insurers often maxi-
mized the gap between insurance premiums and benefit costs
by simply increasing premiums through government-
administered price collusion. When rising benefit costs made
that traditional regulatory capture less politically palatable to
employers, resulting in tighter regulatory control of rates, in-
surers withdrew to residual markets: first, to achieve short-
term gains from risk-free servicing fees and substandard loss
control, and second, to achieve longer-term gains in a kind of
"strike" for legislation shifting work injury risks to workers or
shifting residual market deficit risks to employers (or to non-
participating insurers). And when some states and some em-
ployers responded to insurers' voluntary market "strike" by
turning to "replacement" financing from self-insurance and
from competitive state funds, insurers sometimes sought gov-
ernment protection against their lower-cost replacements.
This alternative story of the workers' compensation in-
surance crisis as insurer moral hazard shows that benefit fi-
nancing systems change the costs of employee benefits in the
process of covering those costs. But how the insurance mar-
ket structure affects benefit costs is not determined simply by
356. See, e.g., DANZON & HARRINGTON, supra note 9, at 28 (explaining that com-
petitive insurance markets, with good information and experience-rated premiums,
would produce "optimal" incentives for insurers and insureds to invest in loss con-
trol).
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whether the insurers are nominally "public" or "private."3 5 7
More critical is how closely and effectively those who gain
from financing workplace risks are held accountable for re-
ducing the costs of those risks to others. Some of the insur-
ance market reforms of the late 1980s and 1990s appear to
have succeeded in increasing insurers' cost accountability to
employers: self-insurance, employer-run competitive state
funds, and price competition have made employers' interest
in reducing insurance costs more central to the benefit fi-
nancing scheme - thereby reducing insurer moral hazard to
some extent.
But these insurance market reforms have perpetuated
and often exacerbated insurer moral hazard toward workers.
Because the insurance financing system in most states is
least accountable to workers' interests, benefit financing
costs (for insurers and employers) are often likely to be re-
duced by shifting costs to workers. Employers and insurers
continue to use their joint political power to maintain benefit
cuts that hold workers responsible for much of the risk of se-
rious occupational injuries or illnesses.3 " Employers' and in-
surers' new emphasis on loss control often means preventing
and minimizing benefit claims rather than preventing work-
ers' injuries or mitigating their effects through good medical
care and appropriate re-employment.
In the prevailing account of the workers' compensation
crisis and reforms, if states now attempt to restore some of
the benefit cuts that have left many injured workers in devas-
tation, they risk reinstating the escalating insurance costs
and collapsing markets of the 1980s. But the alternative
story of the crisis debunks that theory of a simple tradeoff be-
tween insurance costs and benefit levels. By recognizing the
importance of financing structures, not just benefit levels, in
determining benefit costs, better choices can be made about
how to distribute the costs of work accidents.
357. See THOMASON ET AL., supra note 13, at 286-87 (concluding that their empiri-
cal study of the effect of insurance arrangements shows that neither public nor pri-
vate insurance is clearly correlated with lower costs).
358. See id. at 287-90 (concluding that comprehensive deregulation of insurance
markets reduces employers' costs).
359. See, e.g., Workers Comp: Falling Down on the Job, CONSUMER REPORTS, Feb.
2000, at 28-33.
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One lesson of this alternative story of the workers' com-
pensation crisis is that who bears more of the costs of work
accidents depends on who has the power to hold the benefit
financing system accountable to their interests. For workers
to gain more protection against the risks of work accidents,
they should probably seek not just better benefits, but also
better control over benefit financing. For example, competi-
tive state funds could be structured so that governance is
shared equally between employee and employer representa-
tives. Perhaps regulatory requirements for self-insurance
could be designed to include greater employee control over
claims management. Perhaps states could require more pub-
lic control over or oversight of the monopolistic process of col-
lecting and compiling loss cost data shared by insurers.
Such changes might improve the extent to which loss control
is achieved through safety and effective re-employment with-
out necessarily driving up either employers' or insurers' bene-
fit costs.
Whether the prevailing rate suppression story or this al-
ternative story of cost inflation better explains the crisis is a
question not answerable simply by weighing empirical evi-
dence or applying objective economic principles. Whether in-
surers' cost-shifting during the crisis was moral hazard or
simply desirable profit-seeking depends on the underlying po-
litical and moral questions of how much responsibility insur-
ers, rather than workers or employers, should have for con-
trolling the expanded benefit costs of previous decades. The
rate suppression story assumes that workers should have
sacrificed their interest in more generous and easily obtained
benefits to maintain employer and insurer earnings. My al-
ternative account assumes that insurers should have sacri-
ficed their interest in more generous and easily obtained prof-
its to maintain employer and worker earnings. By telling this
alternative story, I hope to bring to the surface the hidden as-
sumptions and missing perspectives of the prevailing rate
suppression story to encourage more careful and open debate
about the problems and possibilities of workers' compensa-
tion reforms.
